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NARROWING DATA PROTECTION’S
ENFORCEMENT GAP
Filippo Lancieri*
ABSTRACT
The rise of data protection laws is one of the most profound legal changes of
this century. Yet, despite their nominal force and widespread adoption, available
data indicates that these laws recurrently suffer from an enforcement gap—that is, a
wide disparity between the stated protections on the books and the reality of how
companies respond to them on the ground. Indeed, Appendix I to this Article
introduces a novel literature review of twenty-six studies that analyzed the impact on
the ground of the GDPR and the CCPA: none found a meaningful improvement in
citizen’s data privacy. This raises the question: what accounts for this gap and what
can be done to improve the performance of these laws?
This Article begins by describing three core building blocks of data protection
regimes in the United States and Europe—namely, market forces, tort liability and
regulatory enforcement—that these jurisdictions combine in different ways to ensure
that companies act in accordance with consumers’ privacy preferences. It then
identifies two key reasons—particularly deep information asymmetries between
companies and consumers/regulators, and high levels of market power in many data
markets—that enable companies to behave strategically to protect private interests
and undermine legal compliance.
The conclusion looks at the institutional design of antitrust and anti-fraud
laws—two regulatory regimes that face similar challenges in their implementation—
to argue that an effective online privacy regulatory system should be built around
three key principles. First, the system must multiply monitoring and enforcement
resources, and antitrust demonstrates how litigation can fund sophisticated civilsociety intermediaries that safeguard consumers. Second, the system must bring
violations to light, and anti-fraud policies demonstrate the importance of establishing
effective whistleblower programs for data protection. Third, the system must
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increase governmental accountability, and antitrust provides examples on how to
promote public transparency without sacrificing enforcement capacity.
INTRODUCTION
The 2016 European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 1 was hailed as
ushering in a new era for digital privacy. It led companies and European countries
to invest significant resources in designing regulatory compliance programs.2 It also
influenced many other online privacy laws adopted across the world—including, to
some extent, the groundbreaking California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018
(CCPA).3 Yet, years later privacy advocates are growing increasingly frustrated with
firms’ lack of compliance and countries’ lax enforcement. Indeed, the gap between
the law on the books and the law in action appeared to be so great that by the end of
2020 many of the GDPR’s strongest supporters warned that it risked becoming a
“fantasy law”—something firms paid lip service to but nonetheless widely failed to
comply with.4 Frustration with the CCPA was equally widespread, leading privacy
advocates to immediately start drafting a new law to strengthen its enforcement
mechanisms—the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA) passed the ballot vote in
November 2020 and will come into force in 2023.5
Concerns around an enforcement gap in data protection laws are sensible. Older
digital privacy regimes in Europe and the United States have largely failed to ensure
that companies comply with consumers’ preferences for increased control over their
personal data.6 While it is too early to decree the failure of newer regimes such as
the GDPR and the CCPA, most of the available analyses point to underwhelming
results. Since both laws entered into force, none of the twenty-six independent
empirical studies conducted to assess their impact on the ground found meaningful
legal compliance.7 For example, a 2019 academic survey found that 92% of
Europe’s most accessed websites tracked users before providing any notice, and 85%
maintained or increased tracking even after the users opted-out—both clear

1. See generally Commission Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of Apr. 27, 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) (EU) [hereinafter GDPR]. This paper uses interchangeably the phrases
“data privacy,” “online privacy,” “data protection,” and “digital privacy” to refer to limits on the collection
and processing of personal data.
2. See Pulse Survey: US Companies Ramping Up General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
Budgets, PWC, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/increasing-it-effectiveness/publications/assets/pwc-gdprseries-pulse-survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/GD6P-FRST] (last visited Dec. 23, 2021).
3. See Paul M. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 771, 816 (2019);
Anupam Chander et al., Catalyzing Privacy Law, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1733, 1764 (2021). By 2020, 142
countries passed some form of data protection legislation, 62 in the past 10 years. Graham Greenleaf &
Bertil Cottier, 2020 Ends a Decade of 62 New Data Privacy Laws, PRIV. L. & BUS. INT’L. REP., Jan. 2020,
at 1-2.
4. See Adam Satariano, Europe’s Privacy Law Hasn’t Shown Its Teeth, Frustrating Advocates, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/27/technology/GDPR-privacy-law-europe.
html [https://perma.cc/W5SY-K28S].
5. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100-1798.199.100 (effective Jan. 1, 2023).
6. See infra Section I.B, Appendix.
7. See infra Appendix.
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violations of the GDPR.8 A cookie sweep of thirty-eight large data processors
performed by the Irish Data Protection Commission found that more than eighteen
months after the GDPR had come into force, 95% violated the law in at least one
meaningful way.9 Another report exposed how European data authorities are
underfunded and poorly staffed.10 There are fewer comprehensive analyses for the
CCPA (it only came into force in January 2020), but the law apparently led to no
changes to Facebook’s data collection and processing practices. 11 A January 2020
survey of the websites of the six hundred largest companies in the U.S. found that
even among the richest, most sophisticated American companies, a majority did not
offer CCPA portals for users to access their information, and in some important
sectors such as technology, media, telecommunications, and health services, only
around 40% of companies did so.12 Another survey of business-to-consumer
companies found that these businesses are receiving an average of eleven datarelated requests per month for every million California consumer identities they hold,
meaning that the CCPA was only used by 0.001% of Californian consumers. 13 The
very passage of the CPRA represented an admission that, despite its broad promises,
the CCPA is unlikely to meaningfully improve consumer data privacy.
These findings raise two questions for academics and policymakers. First, are
there important gaps in the enforcement mechanisms of data protection laws?
Second, if yes, what can be done to improve their performance?
This Article helps answer both questions. First, it suggests that modern data
protection laws largely fail to anticipate how exceptionally large information
asymmetries and market power that are present in many data markets undercut legal
compliance in the shadows of the law. Second, it examines the institutional design
of antitrust and anti-corporate fraud laws—both established legal regimes that face
similar challenges with regards to information asymmetries and market power
undermining compliance—to propose legal and institutional changes that can help
narrow this enforcement gap in data protection.
In order to address these questions, this Article is divided into three parts. Part
I briefly outlines the rise of data protection laws in the U.S. and the EU and reviews
the empirical literature on their (so far limited) impact on the ground.

8. Iskander Sanchez-Rola et al., Can I Opt Out Yet? GDPR and the Global Illusion of Cookie
Control, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2019 ACM ASIA CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS
SECURITY 1, 3-5 (2019) (analyzing 2,000 high profile EU websites).
9. See IRISH DATA PROT. COMM’N, REPORT BY THE DATA PROTECTION COMMISSION ON THE USE
OF COOKIES AND OTHER TRACKING TECHNOLOGIES 6 (2020).
10. See JOHNNY RYAN & ALAN TONER, EUROPE’S GOVERNMENTS ARE FAILING THE GDPR 3, 6
(Brave ed., 2020).
11. Patience Haggin, Facebook Won’t Change Web Tracking in Response to California Privacy Law,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-wont-change-web-tracking-inresponse-to-california-privacy-law-11576175345 [https://perma.cc/92S8-EJ9B].
12. See Jay Cline, CCPA Benchmark: 40% of 600 Largest U.S. Companies Launched a CCPA Portal,
LINKEDIN (Jan. 10, 2020) https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/ccpa-benchmark-40-600-largest-us-compan
ies-launched-portal-jay-cline/?trackingId=%2Blayv2mXQBCngxueMocFIA%3D%3D
[https://perma.cc/8WG8-9TXU].
13. DATAGRAIL, THE STATE OF CCPA: BENCHMARKING CCPA TRENDS ACROSS CONSUMER (B2C)
BRANDS 4 (2021).
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Part II, the core of the Article, explores how Americans and Europeans designed
their legal regimes to harness different combinations of market forces, tort liability,
and regulatory enforcement as mechanisms to ensure that companies reflect
consumers’ privacy preferences. Yet, if consumers cannot understand price-toquality ratios in products that produce or rely on personal data, they cannot take
advantage of the traditional options of exit (switching suppliers) and voice
(complaining to management) as strategies to force companies to comply with their
preferences. Similarly, if consumers and lawyers cannot identify problems in
products and services or link them to recognizable legal harms, then they cannot rely
on tort lawsuits as an alternative to punish non-compliant companies. Finally, the
opacity and complexity of data markets undermines regulatory enforcement in two
distinct manners: (i) it increases the opportunities for companies to distort
regulations to their advantage without facing significant political backlash, and (ii)
it expands the public resources needed to maintain a regulatory regime dedicated to
discovering and successfully prosecuting violations. Lawmakers also failed to
anticipate how market power allows some companies that collect and process a
significant amount of personal data to behave strategically to protect private interests
and undermine legal compliance in the shadows of the law. In particular, dominant
digital platforms rely on the economic and political capabilities associated with their
market power to: (i) design data markets in ways that exacerbate their inherent
information asymmetries, (ii) further undermine consumer exit and voice strategies,
(iii) combat tort litigation and regulatory enforcement, and (iv) influence
governmental policy to their advantage.
While these are relevant flaws in the design of data protection laws, they are not
insurmountable. Part III explores what experiences with the enforcement of antitrust
and anti-corporate fraud laws can teach policymakers in terms of institutional design
changes that can narrow this enforcement gap. Focusing on the institutional
alternatives to diminish information asymmetries in the enforcement of data
protection laws,14 Part III suggests that online privacy regulatory systems should be
built around at least three key principles.
First, the system must multiply monitoring and enforcement resources. In
particular, sophisticated civil-society intermediaries such as privacy nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), independent think-tanks, investigative
journalism outlets, and class-action plaintiffs play an outsized role in ensuring
deterrence and protecting consumers in opaque and complex markets. These
organizations have the incentive and the capacity to understand the complexity of
data collection and denounce violations. In doing so, these organizations can also
monitor the performance of regulatory agencies and increase the costs of regulatory
capture. A comparative look at antitrust policy provides a valuable example of how
regulatory agencies can use the resources raised by public fines, grants, and cy pres

14. Antitrust scholars are increasingly focused on tackling the market power of digital platforms. See
Filippo Lancieri & Patricia Morita Sakowski, Competition in Digital Markets: A Review of Expert
Reports, 26 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 65, 65 (2021) (consolidating expert reports proposing antitrust and
regulatory interventions to diminish the market power of companies such as Google, Facebook, Apple,
and Amazon).
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awards imposed by data protection laws to properly fund their enforcement efforts,
while ensuring their independence from industry interests.
Second, the combination of broad scope, opacity, and complexity that
characterizes data protection encumbers the detection of legal violations, increasing
the resources needed for society to identify non-compliance. To countervail that, the
enforcement system should be designed to bring violations to the attention of
monitors. Antitrust and anti-corporate fraud policies have long relied on leniency
and whistleblower programs to encourage insiders to reveal wrongdoing. Data
protection laws should learn from these policies and develop a solid whistleblower
program to help bring violations to light.
Third, public enforcement systems must ensure that regulators are accountable
to civil society. Governments have a legitimate interest in enabling the widespread
collection of personal data because data is a key input to national security and to
companies competing in a digital world. A combination of governmental interests,
the market power of large digital platforms, and the complexity and opacity that
characterizes many data markets increases the risk that regulators will promote
industry rather than consumer interests. Modern data protection regimes lack
institutional safeguards that can help thwart regulatory capture. While transparency
is key to help societies fight powerful vested interests, many data protection agencies
are opaque. Antitrust regimes provide an example of how to design a regulatory
framework that increases transparency without sacrificing enforcement capacity.
I. THE RISE OF DATA PROTECTION LAWS
A. Data Protection on the Books
The United States and Europe first developed privacy rights to safeguard
individual dignity, autonomy, and to preserve some form of information selfdetermination.15 A right to privacy naturally includes the protection of personal
information that citizens do not want disclosed, and the “right to be left alone.” 16
The increasingly important role that databases containing personal data played in the
lives of citizens during the second half of the 20th Century influenced the expansion
of this “right to informational privacy” to incorporate some form of “right to data
protection.”17

15. See Filippo Maria Lancieri, Digital Protectionism? Antitrust, Data Protection, and the EU/US
Transatlantic Rift, 7 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 27-53 (2019) (summarizing the initial development of privacy
rights in the United States and Europe).
16. Lior Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CAL. L. REV. 2007, 2012 (2010).
17. Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Privacy Principles, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN
THE AGE OF THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 343, 345-46 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006); see also Riley v.
California, 573 U.S. 373, 391 (2014) (concluding that modern day smartphones hold so much personal
data that law enforcement needs a warrant to search them). The U.S. led this recognition of a right to data
protection by passing the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 and the Privacy Act of 1974, as well as a
series of statutes that oversee the collection of specific data such as health (the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996) or children (the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998). In
the EU, this transition started with a 1981 convention, a 1995 directive, and then Article 8 of the EU
Charter on Fundamental Rights, which affirms data protection as a fundamental right. Lancieri, supra
note 15, at 30-31.
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The EU was among the first jurisdictions to enact an economy-wide directive
specifically focused on imposing limits on the collection and processing of personal
data.18 However, widespread concern around the directive’s lack of effectiveness
motivated the passage of the GDPR in 2016.19 The GDPR grants EU citizens strong
rights with regard to their data and also imposes a series of obligations on
governments and companies that handle such data.20 Noteworthy provisions of the
GDPR include: (i) requirements that data are processed in a lawful, fair, and
transparent manner;21 (ii) requirements that users grant explicit consent to enable the
collection and processing of data;22 (iii) data minimization and purpose limitation;23
(iv) a right to be forgotten and to data portability;24 (v) data protection by design and
by default;25 (vi) minimum requirements around data security; 26 (vii) an obligation
that companies perform impact assessments for new technologies or new uses of data
and notify users about data breaches;27 (viii) the strengthening of data protection
authorities;28 and (ix) a right for citizens to go to court to directly obtain full
compensation for damages associated with violations of data protection laws. 29
The U.S. lacks a similar economy-wide data protection regime, historically
relying on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as a de-facto online privacy
regulator.30 The FTC enforces a regime of informed consent, where it primarily
ensures that companies disclose to consumers how the company collects and
processes data so that consumers can make an informed decision on whether to
accept these terms in a take-it-or-leave-it fashion.31 The FTC does not impose
general limits on how personal data is collected or processed. Further, the agency
lacks power to impose fines or other non-voluntary punishments, except in specific
contexts,32 and the Supreme Court recently curtailed the FTC’s power to mandate

18. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., The European Union General Data Protection Regulation: What
it is and What it Means, 28 INFO. & COMMC’NS TECH. L. 65, 69-72 (2019) (summarizing the developments
that led to the GDPR in the EU). Directive 95/46/EC required EU member states to impose limits on the
basis under which companies can collect and process personal data, created rights of access and rights of
rectification, and required the creation of dedicated regulators (among others). It is complemented by
Directive 2002/58/EC (the “ePrivacy Directive”) which requires that users are properly informed and
consent to being tracked by certain types of cookies and other online tracking methods, among other
protections for electronic communications. Id.
19. Id. at 71.
20. See generally id.
21. See GDPR, supra note 1, art. 5.
22. GDPR, supra note 1, arts. 6, 7. While consent is the first, and likely most important, of the
potential bases for the lawful collection and processing of personal data, it is only one of six. See id.
23. Id. arts. 5(1)(b)-5(1)(c)
24. Id. arts. 17, 20.
25. Id. art. 25.
26. Id. arts. 32-34.
27. Id. arts. 33-35.
28. Id. arts. 51-59.
29. Id. arts. 77-83. EU Data Protection authorities can fine companies up to 4% of their worldwide
turnover for violations of data protection laws. Id. art. 83.
30. See Lancieri, supra note 15, at 32.
31. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 583, 592, 603-04 (2014).
32. Id. at 604-05.
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the disgorgement of illegal profits.33 Enforcement is ex-post and focused on fraud
or clear misstatements.
The lack of a federal law combined with the fact that most large tech platforms
are based in California means that the CCPA is the leading U.S. consumer data
privacy regulation.34 The CCPA is both narrower in scope than the GDPR and
reflects fundamental differences in the role privacy plays in society. 35 Nonetheless,
it represents a significant expansion over the simple informed consent doctrine.
Noteworthy provisions include: (i) stronger notification requirements for the
collection and processing of personal data, (ii) a right of access and of erasure, (iii)
a right to object against the selling of personal information, (iv) an obligation that
companies create “data portals,” (v) a right to data portability, (vi) and a direct right
of action for damages in cases of data breaches (up to $750 per incident or actual
damages, whichever is greater).36 The Office of the California Attorney General
holds exclusive powers to enforce most CCPA provisions (apart from data breaches)
and is also responsible for updating the terms of the regulation. 37
In 2020, Californians passed the CPRA through a direct ballot, amending and
expanding the CCPA to strengthen its enforcement mechanisms. The CPRA’s main
additions include: (i) the creation of a subgroup of sensitive personal data; (ii) the
expansion of disclosure requirements; (iii) the expansion of the consumers’ “right to
know” to include all personal data that businesses sell or share for purposes of digital
advertisement (including the right to opt-out of both processes through a “do not sell
or share” and a “limit the use of my sensitive personal information” button); (iv) the
right to limit the use and disclosure of sensitive personal data; (v) the creation of the
California Privacy Protection Agency (a regulatory agency with powers to enact
regulations and impose administrative fines); and (vi) the determination that 9% of
a fund that collects data protection fines should be annually distributed to civil
society as grants.38
The GDPR, CCPA, and CPRA are distinct bodies of law that differ in many
important manners.39 Yet, at their core they reflect a general belief that companies

33. See AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 593 U.S. 1341 (2021). At the time of this
writing the U.S. Congress is discussing reinstating the FTC’s powers. See Rebecca Klar, House Passes
Bill to Revive FTC Authority to Recover Money for Consumers, THE HILL (July 20, 2021), https://thehill.
com/policy/technology/564001-house-passes-bill-to-revive-ftc-authority-to-recover-money-forconsumers [https://perma.cc/G927-EU45].
34. Chander et al., supra note 3, at 1769.
35. Lancieri, supra note 15, at 32 (explaining how Europeans treat data as a fundamental right, while
Americans treat data as an asset).
36. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100, 1798.105, 1798.110, 1798.125, 1798.130, 1798.150, 1798.155,
1798.185 (effective until Jan. 1, 2023). Penalties vary between $2,500 per routine violation and $7,500
per intentional violation. Id. § 1798.155.
37. Id § 1798.155.
38. Id. §§ 1798.115, 1798.120, 1798.121, 1798.130, 1798.135, 1798.140, 1798.160, 1798.199. Like
the California Attorney General, the California Privacy Protection Agency can also impose administrative
fines of up to $2,500 per each non-intentional violation of the law and $7,500 per each intentional
violation. Id. § 1798.155.
39. See Chander et al., supra note 3, at 1746-62 (comparing the GDPR and the CCPA and concluding
that they offer “a fundamentally different regime [for data privacy]”).
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were not responsive to citizens’ preferences for increased control over how their
personal data is collected and processed.40
The GDPR was passed partially in response to widespread concerns by
European citizens regarding the collection and processing of personal data. For
example, 67% of Europeans were concerned about not having complete control over
their personal data, 69% were concerned about mismatches between information
collection and processing, and 90% believed it was important to have similar data
protection rights across the EU.41 The GDPR states that a central tenet of data
protection is that Europeans have a right to know what type of personal data is being
collected about them and how it is processed.42 The GDPR is expressly designed to
address short-comings with the enforcement of older European data protection
regimes by creating a system that protects these fundamental privacy rights and
ensures compliance.43
Similarly, a majority of Americans are concerned about data harvesting by
corporations—81% of respondents to a 2019 survey indicated that they lacked
control over their personal data and that the risks of data collection outweighed the
benefits while 79% were concerned that their data was being misused.44 By passing
the CCPA, California’s legislature explicitly intended to give California consumers
“an effective way to control their personal information” by giving them the right: (i)
“to know what personal information is being collected about them”; (ii) “to know
whether their personal information is sold or disclosed and to whom”; (iii) “to say
no to the sale of personal information”; (iv) “to access their personal information”;
and (v) “to receive equal service and price, even if they exercise their privacy
rights”.45 The CCPA was initially slated to be subject to a public vote and the wide
expectation of its passage forced the industry to cut a legislative deal.46 The CPRA,
which proposed to strengthen these enforcement mechanisms, ultimately won the
public vote by a landslide and expressively states that consumers are not aware of
how companies collect and process personal data, that they need stronger laws to
40. GDPR recitals 7 and 11 expressly state that “[n]atural persons should have control of their own
personal data” and that this requires the development of a strong regime to ensure compliance. GDPR,
supra note 1, recitals 7, 11. The CCPA Section (2)(h) states that “[p]eople desire privacy and more control
over their information. California consumers should be able to exercise control over their personal
information, and they want to be certain that there are safeguards against misuse of their personal
information.” A.B. 375, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
41. See GDPR, supra note 1, recitals 7, 9, 11; EUR. COMM’N, SPECIAL EUROBAROMETER 431 - DATA
PROTECTION 4, 10, 15 (2015).
42. GDPR, supra note 1, recital 39; Chander et al., supra note 3, at 1750.
43. See GDPR, supra note 1, recitals 9, 11.
44. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling Lack of
Control Over Their Personal Information (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/wpcontent/uploads/sites/9/2019/11/Pew-Research-Center_PI_2019.11.15_Privacy_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/284T-7FXT]; see also Alessandro Acquisti et al., The Economics of Privacy, 54 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 442, 476 (2016) (stressing how survey and other evidence indicates that the protection of
personal privacy is a leading concern in the U.S.).
45. A.B. 375, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
46. See Annotated Text of the California Privacy Rights Act, CALIFORNIANS FOR CONSUMER PRIV.,
https://www.caprivacy.org/annotated-cpra-text-with-ccpa-changes/
[https://perma.cc/4XN6-RYWT]
(last visited Dec. 23, 2021) [hereinafter Annotated Text] (Section 2(C)); Chander et al., supra note 3, at
1781-82 (describing the disputes surrounding the passage of the CCPA).
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protect their fundamental privacy rights, and that the Government of California must
strengthen the enforcement of these rights over time.47
Some have discounted this clear preference for increased data control, asserting
that while citizens submit that they want increased protection, they trade their
personal data for small incentives—an apparent contradiction known as the privacy
paradox.48 Yet, while some disconnect between stated privacy preferences and
actual personal behavior does exists, 49 there is also “ample and enduring” evidence
that consumers recurrently act to protect their privacy in both online and offline
scenarios;50 and many paradoxical cases can be explained by the fact that data
protection is “extraordinarily difficult to manage, or regulate, in the internet age” as
firms explore known limitations in consumer rationality to extract as much personal
information as viable.51
That is not to say that every citizen has strong preferences for increased data
protection, nor that these laws are perfect—the GDPR and the CCPA have been
praised by many,52 but criticized by some who believe they harm innovation, replace
consumers’ preferences with regulators’ preferences, and stifle free expression. 53
Rather, they reinforce the notion that consumers’ persistent call for better data
protection should be accounted for.54 A key reason driving the passage of the largely
popular CCPA, CPRA and GDPR by the democratically elected governments in
California and the EU is exactly because they found a disconnect exists between
citizens preferences for increased protection and control of their personal data, and
market practices ignoring these preferences. Equally important, these laws are
leading to billions of dollars of investments in compliance programs. 55 Societies
must ensure that these expenditures are not simply wasted, but actually change
market practices.

47. Annotated Text, supra note 46 (Sections 2(E)-(H)).
48. See Alessandro Acquisti et al., Secrets and Likes: The Drive for Privacy and the Difficulty of
Achieving It in the Digital Age, 30 J. CONSUMER PSYCH. 736, 749 (2020).
49. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz & Matthew B. Kugler, Is Privacy Policy Language Irrelevant to
Consumers?, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. S69, S78 (2016) (documenting the existence of the privacy paradox).
50. Acquisti et al., supra note 48, at 737; Acquisti et al., supra note 44, at 477-78. These scenarios
range from simple analysis of consumer behavior to surveys, field studies, experiments and other pieces
of data.
51. Acquisti et al., supra note 48, at 740-44, 750. Numerous processes negatively impact privacyrelated rational decision-making in specific circumstances, from extreme information asymmetries to
bounded rationality, hyperbolic discounting, resignation, herding, or cognitive and behavioral biases. See
Daniel J. Solove, The Myth of the Privacy Paradox, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2021) (explaining how
many times privacy expectations and behavior may involve different considerations).
52. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 772-73.
53. See The 10 Problems of the GDPR; Hearing on The General Data Protection Regulation and
California Consumer Privacy Act: Opt-ins, Consumer Control, and the Impact on Competition and
Innovation (2019) (statement of Roslyn Layton, Visiting Scholar).
54. Acquisti et al., supra note 48, at 750.
55. See PwC, supra note 2; Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy Law’s False Promise, 97 WASH. U. L. REV.
773, 777, 803-07 (2020) (describing the large “paper trails” created by privacy compliance programs, but
that do not materially improve data protection).
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B. An Underwhelming Track-Record (So Far)
Despite these bold ambitions, the historical track-record of data protection laws
in the EU and the U.S. is underwhelming. A solid body of work shows how private
parties never complied with the commands of two European data protection
directives that preceded the GDPR.56 By one account, an average of 74% of EU
websites constantly violated the rules without suffering any form of punishment. 57
Across the Atlantic, even governmental authorities have deemed the FTC as
incapable of ensuring meaningful regulatory deterrence because of its lack of power
to fine firms for data-related violations. This criticism came before the Supreme
Court largely gutted the FTC’s capacity to disgorge illegal profits, leaving the agency
almost powerless.58 A general diagnosis is that the Fair Information Privacy
Principles (the foundation of legacy data protection regimes on both sides of the
Atlantic) have largely failed to achieve their stated goals of aligning the privacy
preferences of consumers and companies and increasing data protection.59 Private
self-regulation has not fared any better.60 That is mainly because these older laws
were “toothless” or “paper tigers.”61
The GDPR and the CCPA were partially designed to address these
shortcomings. Changes in the GDPR, for example, were specifically aimed at
bringing data protection closer to antitrust regulation in terms of enforcement, fining
capacity, etc.62 Issuing a definitive judgment on the performance of these laws is
complicated for at least two reasons. First, because these are new and complex
regulatory regimes, it is possible that enforcement will initially be suboptimal, but
will improve as the laws mature. Second, because many data protection markets are
so opaque, reliable evidence for empirical studies is hard to obtain.
Still, notwithstanding these limitations, the Appendix contains a comprehensive
survey of studies that independently assess compliance with the commands of the
GDPR and, to a lesser extent, the CCPA. The available evidence consistently
indicates an underwhelming impact of these new regimes. Out of twenty-six

56. See Ronald Leenes & Eleni Kosta, Taming the Cookie Monster with Dutch Law: A Tale of
Regulatory Failure, 31 COMPUT. L. SEC. REV. 317, 329 (2015).
57. Martino Trevisan et al., 4 Years of EU Cookie Law: Results and Lessons Learned, 2019 PROC.
ON PRIV. ENHANCING TECHS. 126, 127, 133, 140 (2019) (surveying 35,000 popular EU websites and
finding that 49% placed tracking cookies before receiving consent—a violation of the directive).
58. A wide review of FTC enforcement actions by the Government Accountability Office concluded
that all but a handful of FTC cases resulted in settlements and recommended the development of a strong
regulator with the capacity to regulate the market and impose broad civil penalties. U.S GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-52, INTERNET PRIVACY: ADDITIONAL FEDERAL AUTHORITY COULD
ENHANCE CONSUMER PROTECTION AND PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY 37 (2019); see also AMG Capital Mgmt.,
LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 141 S. Ct. 1341 (2021).
59. Cate, supra note 17, at 344.
60. See generally Robert Gellman & Pam Dixon, Failures of Privacy Self-Regulation in the United
States, in ENFORCING PRIVACY 53 (2016).
61. Sebastian J. Golla, Is Data Protection Law Growing Teeth: The Current Lack of Sanctions in
Data Protection Law and Administrative Fines Under the GDPR, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ECOMMERCE L. 70, 70 (2017); see also Hoofnagle et al., supra note 18, at 93 (stressing how “directive
[95/46] was plagued by ineffective sanctions”). Both refer to European data protection laws, but the
conclusion can easily be extended to the FTC.
62. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 18, at 67, 92.
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independent evaluations, none found that these laws led to meaningful increases in
data protection. For example, a survey of privacy protection policies of almost two
hundred large firms before and after the GDPR found that while the legislation led
to textual changes, “the overall level of compliance [with GDPR provisions] is not
high in absolute terms.”63 A 2019 review of the EU’s two thousand most-accessed
websites found that 92% of those websites tracked users before providing any notice
and 85% of users were unable to opt out of being tracked—violating the
Regulation.64 These findings are supported by another study analyzing the five
hundred most visited websites in each EU country, which concluded that the amount
of user tracking pre and post-GDPR stayed the same, and warned against a false
sense of GDPR compliance.65 Even EU authorities are finding widespread
violations, as shown by a survey of thirty-eight large data processors performed by
the Irish data protection authority, which found that more than eighteen months after
the GDPR had come into effect, 95% presented at least one significant violation of
the law.66 A similar study of 175 websites by the Dutch data protection authority
found that the vast majority of those websites assessed did not comply with the law. 67
There are less independent data on CCPA compliance, but the trend is similar. A
February 2020 PwC survey of the websites of the six hundred largest companies in
the U.S. reported that a majority did not offer portals for users to access their
information.68 A 2021 survey of business-to-consumer companies found that these
businesses are receiving on average eleven data-related requests per month for every
million California consumer identities they hold, which means that the CCPA was
used by 0.001% of Californian consumers.69 A September 2020 scan of more than
eighty-thousand of the world’s most popular websites found that tracking remains
ubiquitous around the world, including the U.S., even for highly sensitive websites
such as those searching for abortion providers or resources for victims of sexual
violence.70 A follow-up article noted that third-party tracking is as pervasive now as
it was ten years ago, but it has only “become creepier and more difficult to stop.” 71
These conclusions are backed by other evidence. After a detailed analysis of the
internal data protection compliance practices of certain companies, Professor Ari
Waldman described the GDPR and the CCPA as a “house of cards” that is failing to

63. Kevin E. Davis & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Contracting for Personal Data, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV.
662, 699 (2019).
64. Sanchez-Rola et al., supra note 8, at 2, 10 (analyzing 2,000 high profile EU websites).
65. Martin Degeling et al., We Value Your Privacy . . . Now Take Some Cookies: Measuring the
GDPR’s Impact on Web Privacy 7-8, 10, 14 (Feb. 2019) (on file with arXiv.org).
66. IRISH DATA PROT. COMM’N, supra note 9, at 6.
67. Nieuwsbericht, AP: Veel Websites Vragen Op Onjuiste Wijze Toestemming Voor Plaatsen
Tracking Cookies, AUTORITEIT PERSOONSGEGEVENS (Dec. 19, 2019), https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.
nl/nl/nieuws/ap-veel-websites-vragen-op-onjuiste-wijze-toestemming-voor-plaatsen-tracking-cookies
[https://perma.cc/2FUW-H49R].
68. PWC, supra note 2.
69. DATAGRAIL, supra note 13, at 5.
70. Aaron Sankin & Surya Mattu, The High Privacy Cost of a “Free” Website, THE MARKUP (Sept.
22, 2020), https://themarkup.org/blacklight/2020/09/22/blacklight-tracking-advertisers-digital-privacysensitive-websites [https://perma.cc/HW4S-QNB5].
71. Julia Angwin, What They Know . . . Now, THE MARKUP (Sept. 22, 2020), https://themarkup.org/
blacklight/2020/09/22/what-they-know-now [https://perma.cc/AYF3-KYUZ].
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deliver its promised protections because formal compliance with privacy law is
prioritized over actual substance.72 European data protection agencies received more
than 275,000 complaints in the first eighteen months after the GDPR came into force,
but issued only 785 fines in the same time period.73 Data protection agencies are
generally underfunded and poorly staffed.74 “Nearly every European government
underfunds its [data protection agency]” and regulators in all jurisdictions (except
Germany) lack tech specialists.75 The head of the Irish data protection agency,76
Helen Dixon, graded her own agency’s two-year GDPR enforcement performance
as an “A for effort” but a “C-plus/B-minus in terms of output.”77 The chairman of
the German data protection authority, Ulrich Kelber, summarized the situation as:
“we have a lack of enforcement.”78 The head of the Hamburg data protection
authority said that they are “completely critical of the enforcement structure of the
GDPR,” and that “[t]he . . . whole system doesn’t work.”79 On the other side of the
Atlantic, when asked about the enforcement of the CCPA, the California Attorney
General stated that the lack of resources would force the agency to look kindly on
companies that simply “demonstrate an effort to comply.”80 Californians passed the
CPRA to fill-in what they identified as substantial gaps in the enforcement structures
of the CCPA.
As Professor David Erdos aptly summarized: “with ever increasing digitization,
the gap between the [privacy] law on the books and the implementation and
enforcement on the ‘virtual’ ground [initially described as very large] is almost
certainly increasing.”81 Given this somewhat discouraging background, academics
and policymakers hoping to improve the performance of data protection laws must
ask themselves: (i) are there important gaps in the design of data protection laws that
enable companies to ignore their commands, and, if yes, (ii) what legal and
institutional changes can help improve the performance of these laws?
Parts II and III below help tackle these difficult problems.

72. Waldman, supra note 55, at 776, 786, 803.
73. EUR. COMM’N, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT: COMMUNICATION FROM THE
COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL—DATA PROTECTION AS A PILLAR OF
CITIZENS’ EMPOWERMENT AND THE EU’S APPROACH TO THE DIGITAL TRANSITION—TWO YEARS OF
APPLICATION OF THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION 20, 5 (2020).
74. See RYAN & TONER, supra note 10, at 3, 6.
75. Id.
76. The Irish data protection agency is the authority responsible for overseeing Google, Facebook,
Apple, Twitter, and other large tech platforms. See Satariano, supra note 4.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Vincent Manancourt & Mark Scott, Two Years into New EU Privacy Regime, Questions Hang
Over Enforcement, POLITICO (May 25, 2020), https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-data-protectionprivacy-gdpr-anniversary/ [https://perma.cc/BQ7C-UZHR].
80. Nandita Bose, California AG Says Privacy Law Enforcement to be Guided by Willingness to
Comply, REUTERS (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-privacy-california-idUSKBN
1YE2C4 [https://perma.cc/C5AV-MSF5].
81. David Erdos, Acontextual and Ineffective? Reviewing the GDPR Two Years On, INFORRM (May
5, 2020), https://inforrm.org/2020/05/05/acontextual-and-ineffective-reviewing-the-gdpr-two-years-ondavid-erdos/ [https://perma.cc/U7KL-SXK3].
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II. HOW DESIGN FAILURES UNDERMINE DATA PROTECTION ENFORCEMENT
Online privacy laws such as the GDPR and the CCPA are sophisticated pieces
of legislation that rely on different combinations of market forces, tort liability, and
public regulation to ensure that companies act in accordance with consumers’
privacy preferences. Yet, a particularly pervasive combination of large structural
information asymmetries and market power, which is present in many data markets,
undermines all three mechanisms as drivers of legal compliance.
A. Market Forces
1. Markets Can Force Companies to Reflect the Privacy Preferences of Consumers
Markets are the most cost-effective mechanism to ensure that companies reflect
the preferences of consumers. Yet, information asymmetries and economic power
can prevent markets from delivering such outcomes.
More specifically, markets represent the aggregate of two different types of
strategic behavior consumers adopt when faced with a decline in the quality of a
given good, service, or organization: exit or voice.82 Exit is a binary choice that
reflects the invisible hand working at its best. Whenever the quality of a good or
service goes down, consumers shift to another supplier. Voice is protest, where
consumers continue buying from the firm but complain to management that the
quality is going down. Exit and voice are not mutually exclusive, but exit is the
foundation of consumers’ ability to discipline companies because voice requires at
least a threat of exit to work.83 Exit and voice are powerful. If markets are
competitive and consumers are well-informed, a combination of customers switching
and complaining will force companies to supply what consumers desire and ensure
allocative efficiency.84 This aggregation of consumer behavior is a cheap, effective,
and decentralized mechanism that conveys information to firms and enforces
heterodox consumer preferences.
Data protection laws have historically endeavored to harness the power of
markets as a mechanism to ensure that companies reflect consumers’ data
preferences. As seen above, notice and consent obligations have long been a
backbone of data protection laws, even before the passage of modern regimes. Albeit
differing in important ways, both the CCPA and the GDPR further strengthened these
notice and consent provisions by enabling consumers to access, correct, and delete
the information companies hold about them, and to withdraw consent to stop the
collection of personal data at any point in time.85 Both laws also establish (different)
82. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4, 21, 30 (1970).
83. See Keith Dowding, Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in
Firms, Organizations, and States, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CLASSICS IN PUBLIC POLICY AND
ADMINISTRATION 257 (Steven J. Balla et al. eds., 2015).
84. Id.; see also Adrian Kuenzler, Direct Consumer Influence—The Missing Strategy to Integrate
Data Privacy Preferences into the Market, 39 Y.B. EUR. L. 423, 427-29 (2020) (providing examples for
some segments of the digital economy).
85. See Chander et al., supra note 3, at 1750-55 (explaining how both the GDPR and the CCPA
contain different provisions to increase transparency over data collection and processing); see
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minimum levels of information that must be supplied to users before companies can
collect their data, including what type and the extent of personal data that is amassed
and how it will be processed.86 Rights to data portability present in both laws—
which generally enable consumers to transfer their personal data to alternative
suppliers—are another mechanism to release consumers from a potential lock-in due
to a company’s control over their data. Well-informed, unrestrained consumers can
then trigger exit and voice as strategic responses to a bad bargain involving their
personal data, forcing companies to account for their preferences.
Markets, however, only work if there is meaningful competition: voice without
a credible threat of exit is ineffective, as a monopolist can dismiss consumer
discontentment and continue to appropriate rents without much economic loss. 87
Markets also fail when large information asymmetries increase consumers’ search
costs: The exercise of exit and voice depends on consumers perceiving a decline in
quality and acknowledging that alternative suppliers offer better terms. This
acquisition of information, however, is costly and often subject to collective action
problems.88 This is particularly true for complex and opaque goods where it is hard
to perceive relative quality. These failures are also found in many markets where
data is a key input and where deep information asymmetries, opacity, and economic
concentration prevent meaningful consumer exit and voice.
2. The Heightened Information Asymmetries in Data Protection
Information asymmetries are common in data protection and negatively impact
consumers’ capacity to effectively manage online privacy.89 Privacy policies run for
thousands of words and are generally not designed to optimize consumer
understanding.90 It would take a typical user several weeks to read all of the privacy
policies they sign in one year.91 As a result, these policies—the main technique to

also Wolfgang Kerber & Karsten K. Zolna, The German Facebook Case: The Law and Economics of the
Relationship between Competition and Data Protection Law 15-19 (Sept. 20, 2020) (on file with
SSRN.com) (explaining how the GDPR focuses on addressing information and consumer behavior market
failures in data markets, but ignores concentration aspects, such as what they call a dual market failure).
86. For example, the GDPR requires that consent should be specific and unambiguous. Whenever
the data processing has multiple purposes, a specific consent must be given to each purpose, and that clear
imbalance between the data subject and the controller may imply that consent was not freely given.
GDPR, supra note 1, recital 43. Heightened consent requirements apply to specific types of sensitive
personal data, such as sexual orientation, religion, and others. Id. art. 9. The CCPA just requires general
notices. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100(b) (effective until Jan. 1, 2023).
87. See Dowding, supra note 83, at 2-3, 10; see also HIRSCHMAN, supra note 82, at 82, 97.
88. See Dowding, supra note 83, at 10.
89. See Acquisti et al., supra note 48, at 742; see also Acquisti et al., supra note 44, at 448.
90. For example, an investigation by the British Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)
concluded that consumers hardly engage with the privacy controls of Google and Facebook because both
companies have strong incentives to maximize consumer data collection, and they actively do so by
amplifying information asymmetries and abusing choice architectures in ways that harm consumer choice
and consumer privacy. See COMPETITION & MKTS. AUTH., ONLINE PLATFORMS AND DIGITAL
ADVERTISING 149 (2020).
91. Alecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. &
POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 563 (2008) (estimating that it would take the average American 244 hours
per year, or forty minutes per day, to read all the online privacy policies they encounter).
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inform consumers about the collection and processing of their personal data—are all
but ignored.92
Even in an ideal world where companies optimized consumer understanding and
consumers read all policies, it would be all but impossible for users to fully
comprehend what is done with their data. Data-intensive industries tend to be
extremely complex and companies have strong economic incentives to invest in
gathering an increasing amount of consumer information.93 Companies use different
and obscure means to collect user data, including sign-in and subscription tracking,
cookies, web tags, ad tags, pixels, fingerprinting, mobile apps, and cellphone
tracking.94 A traditional user is tracked by an average of at least eighteen different
companies in their regular web browsing alone,95 and most mobile apps and devices
also collect and share a large amount of personal data.96 For example, Google
collects, by default, a significant amount of personal data from all Android users.
Surveys have found that apps downloaded from the Google Play Store host a median
of five different trackers and 88% of Google Play apps share data back with Google
(43% with Facebook).97
Even if users could comprehend the complexity of this data collection network,
some forms of surveillance cannot be prevented by consumers alone. Data collection
mechanisms such as pixels, web bugs, and fingerprints are effectively invisible to
the user.98 For example, Google does not allow Android users to become fully
anonymized to advertisers.99 In addition, all major mobile carriers in the U.S. were
fined for selling real-time user location data without consent.100 Many of these
companies, such as Google and Facebook, responded to data protection laws not by
diminishing data collection but rather by embedding their third-party code in first92. The CMA found that between zero and 5% of Google UK users accessed the company’s privacy
policies, and 85% of those who did, spent less than ten seconds on the page—these numbers are so low
that one must conclude that they were mis-clicks (though the CMA does not conclude that). Similarly,
between zero and 5% of Facebook users accessed its privacy control features over a twenty-eight day
period. COMPETITION & MKTS. AUTH., supra note 90, at 173-75.
93. See Acquisti et al., supra note 48, at 745; see also Acquisti et al., supra note 44, at 463.
94. For a detailed analysis, see AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N, DIGITAL PLATFORMS
INQUIRY – FINAL REPORT 130 (2019), https://www.accc.gov.au/publications/digital-platforms-inquiryfinal-report [https://perma.cc/3CCL-M3GU].
95. Steven Englehardt & Arvind Narayanan, Online Tracking: A 1-million-site Measurement and
Analysis 1396 (Oct. 24, 2016) (on file with ACM.org) (surveying one hundred random websites out of
the five hundred most accessed websites in sixteen categories and finding an average of eighteen different
third parties tracking users per site).
96. See Elias P. Papadopoulos et al., The Long-Standing Privacy Debate: Mobile Websites vs Mobile
Apps 154, 158 (Apr. 3, 2017) (on file with ACM.org); COMPETITION & MKTS. AUTH., supra note 90, app.
G at G37-G38.
97. See Reuben Binns et al., Third Party Tracking in the Mobile Ecosystem 27-28 (May 15, 2018)
(on file with ACM.org); COMPETITION & MKTS. AUTH., supra note 90, app. F at F16, app. G at G10.
98. Acquisti et al., supra note 44, at 463-64.
99. See AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N, supra note 94, at 130.
100. See Klint Finley, The FCC Fines Wireless Companies for Selling Users’ Location Data, WIRED
(Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/fcc-fines-wireless-companies-selling-users-location-data/
[https://perma.cc/QP2E-EW8D]. Given that cellphones are designed to connect to the network, the only
way to not be tracked would be to avoid using the phone’s network capabilities. Even anonymized
cellphone data can be easily re-identified. See Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the Crowd:
The Privacy Bounds of Human Mobility, SCI. REPS., Oct.-Mar. 2013, at 4.
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party applications, a practice that users cannot easily block.101 In theory, “privacy
labels” or other similar alternatives can help consumers by conveying information
that users can easily process and incorporate in their decision-making. However,
privacy labels have failed in other markets in general,102 and data markets in
particular.103 Privacy labels cannot address the many externalities involved in data
processing.104 Dark patterns employed in design interfaces can also greatly influence
consumer decision-making, sometimes without significant awareness or
pushback.105
Once personal information is collected, it can behave as a public good—a nonrival, non-excludable good that can be easily and cheaply copied and quickly spread
through a complex web of companies and data brokers.106 Once data has been
shared, it is hard to purge it from this complex system. In addition, advances in
computer power and mining techniques mean that companies find new uses for old
data that even the companies themselves did not anticipate at the time of
collection.107
In such a context, the sophisticated disclosure and consent obligations of the
CCPA and the GDPR cannot wash away the fact that mandated disclosure and other
provisions aimed at increasing consumer data awareness have failed. As previously
addressed, multiple studies have confirmed the high levels of information
asymmetries and opacity in data collection and processing. The vast majority of
people do not read privacy policies and do not understand data collection and
processing, and simplification attempts have not changed that. 108 As of October
2019, only 29% of Americans knew that Facebook owned Instagram and
WhatsApp,109 and only 26% understood that Facebook created user profiles to target

101. See COMPETITION & MKTS. AUTH., supra note 90, app. G at G107-08 (explaining this shift and
how it enables continued tracking despite decreases in third-party cookies).
102. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 647, 650-51 (2011) (describing how “[m]andated disclosure is ubiquitous . . . [but] [n]ot only does
the empirical evidence show that mandated disclosure regularly fails in practice, but its failure is
inevitable”).
103. Omri Ben-Shahar & Adam Chilton, Simplification of Privacy Disclosures: An Experimental Test,
45 J. LEGAL STUD. S41, S41-42 (2016); see also Christine Utz et al., (Un)informed Consent: Studying
GDPR Consent Notices in the Field 974 (Oct. 22, 2019) (on file with arXiv.org) (reporting on results
showing how consent can be easily manipulated by dark patterns such as the consent notice’s position on
the browser and the colors used).
104. Omri Ben-Shahar, Data Pollution, 11 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 104, 120 (2019) (describing how
externalities in data collection prevent private contracting regarding data from being socially efficient).
105. See Jamie Luguri & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark Patterns, 13 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 43, 44 (2021).
106. Acquisti et al., supra note 44, at 446 (affirming that shared personal data behaves like a public
good, while one of the core tenets of data protection is to be able to exclude access to certain types of
data); see generally Englehardt & Narayanan, supra note 95, at 1394-95 (finding more than 81,000
tracking third parties).
107. See Acquisti et al., supra note 44, at 444, 447, 481.
108. Id. at 479 (“[N]umerous empirical studies have highlighted the limitations of transparency
mechanisms [to increase data protection.”).
109. Emily A. Vogels & Monica Anderson, Americans and Digital Knowledge, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct.
9, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/10/09/americans-and-digital-knowledge/ [https://
perma.cc/57M3-3SYM].

32

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1

ads.110 If consumers cannot grasp even the basics of the data collection network,
they will not understand that when they use a cellphone app, their real time location
data is being sold to a complex network that enables the U.S. Federal Government
to enforce immigration laws or track potential terrorist threats, and journalists to
track the private lives of public officials (among other obscure uses of personal
data).111 Uninformed consumers cannot exercise exit or voice, undermining the role
of markets as mechanisms to help promote compliance with privacy laws.
3. Market Concentration Further Hinders Exit and Voice
Information asymmetries, however, provide only a partial explanation for why
market solutions appear to be failing to meet consumers’ privacy preferences.
Another problem is that the economic structure of many data markets pushes them
into winner-takes-all or winner-takes-most scenarios, where only one or several
leading companies thrive. Indeed, reports from expert panels and antitrust
authorities from around the world highlight the role of network effects, large
economies of scale and scope (in part due to network effects), low marginal costs,
and low distribution costs in inducing concentration in different data markets. 112
Many of these dynamics are connected to the crucial role data plays as an input to
products and services of the digital economy.113 More importantly, these conclusions
are supported by detailed analyses of particular competitive conditions in different
relevant markets, including: (i) search engines,114 (ii) social media,115 (iii) search
advertising,116 (iv) display advertising,117 (v) mobile app stores and mobile operating
systems,118 (vi) online marketplaces,119 and (vii) mobile mapping services.120
In addition, concentration is growing in the infrastructure and backbone of the
internet. Amazon Web Services commands the internet cloud industry. 121 Google
110. Paul Hitlin & Lee Rainie, Facebook Algorithms and Personal Data, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 16,
2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/01/16/facebook-algorithms-and-personal-data/ [https:
//perma.cc/6NLF-XNDT].
111. See Byron Tau & Michelle Hackman, Federal Agencies Use Cellphone Location Data for
Immigration Enforcement, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-agenciesuse-cellphone-location-data-for-immigration-enforcement-11581078600 [https://perma.cc/RJ42-3YNH];
see also Joseph Cox, How the U.S. Military Buys Location Data from Ordinary Apps, VICE (Nov. 16,
2020), https://www.vice.com/en/article/jgqm5x/us-military-location-data-xmode-locate-x [https://perma.
cc/NH9U-HRTS]; Tim De Chant, Catholic Priest Quits After “Anonymized” Data Revealed Alleged Use
of Grindr, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 21, 2021), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2021/07/catholic-priestquits-after-anonymized-data-revealed-alleged-use-of-grindr/ [https://perma.cc/QFN2-3R7B].
112. Lancieri & Sakowski, supra note 14, at 74-75.
113. See Michal S. Gal & Oshrit Aviv, The Competitive Effects of the GDPR, 16 J. COMPETITION L.
ECON. 349, 352 (2020).
114. See Lancieri & Sakowski, supra note 14, at 137; see also Adrian Kuenzler, Advancing Quality
Competition in Big Data Markets, 15 J. COMPETITION L. ECON. 500, 515 (2020) (discussing limits on the
exercise of exit and voice in search markets).
115. See Lancieri & Sakowski, supra note 14, at 144.
116. Id. at 126-27.
117. Id. at 129-30.
118. Id. at 106-07.
119. Id. at 112.
120. Id. at 115.
121. Id. at 116-17.
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Maps API has an estimated 85% global market share.122 Google Font API has a 88%
market share.123 Google Tag Manager, including Google Analytics, covers more
than 80% of popular websites, while Facebook covers around 40% of the same
websites.124 These are all avenues for companies to collect consumer data. Many
companies also obtain sensitive data directly from providers. For example, Google
has direct access to credit card data;125 61% of mobile apps transfer data to Facebook
the moment a consumer opens the app, even if the user does not have a Facebook
account;126 and approximately 88% of Google Play Store apps transfer data back to
Google.127 To avoid the collection of personal data due to backbone concentration
or business-to-business deals, consumers would have to all but stop using the
internet.128
The provisions of the CCPA and the GDPR on data portability are aimed at
facilitating consumer exit in markets where data is a key input. However, porting
the data of a single consumer at a specific point in time—what is normally allowed
by data portability rights—will do little to weaken the significant market power of
leading digital platforms and enable consumer exit. Although individual data
portability may be coordinated into a larger effort that could have such power, this
coordination faces a chicken-and-egg problem. Competitors struggle to obtain the
critical mass that would trigger a natural migration, and consumers face a collective
action problem to independently organize such migration. In addition, data
portability rights usually do not include constant portability of updated and accurate
data, a problem for markets that require a constant flow of fresh data. 129 As such,
simple data portability is unlikely to enhance consumers’ exit strategies.
An alternative approach is to establish a broader obligation of data
interoperability—that is, the automated and constant transfer of personal data
between two service providers (e.g. between Facebook and a smaller social
network).130 This solution, however, has its own shortcomings. First, in the absence
of a clear legal mandate, interoperability faces legal hurdles. For example, U.S. antihacking laws may be used by companies to prevent third parties from accessing
122. Mapping and GIS Software Market Share, DATANYZE, https://www.datanyze.com/market-share/
mapping-and-gis--121 [https://perma.cc/CNQ3-V2TE] (last visited Dec. 23, 2021).
123. Web Fonts Software Market Share, DATANYZE, https://www.datanyze.com/market-share/webfonts [https://perma.cc/289Z-58AK] (last visited Dec. 23, 2021). Google Fonts is a free, open-source web
fonts software that websites use for formatting. While Google states it does not collect data in exchange
for the fonts, the control over the infrastructure allows the company to change the practice anytime. Id.
124. COMPETITION & MKTS. AUTH., supra note 90, app. G, at G99-G100.
125. Mark Bergen & Jennifer Surane, Google and Mastercard Cut a Secret Ad Deal to Track Retail
Sales, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-30/google-andmastercard-cut-a-secret-ad-deal-to-track-retail-sales [https://perma.cc/N97Z-2ML6].
126. AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N, supra note 94, at 391.
127. Binns et al., supra note 97, at 27.
128. See GUNES ACAR ET AL., THE WEB NEVER FORGETS: PERSISTENT TRACKING MECHANISMS IN
THE WILD 674-89 (2014) (surveying the one hundred thousand most popular Alexa websites in 2014 for
online tracking techniques that cannot be stopped by users, such as fingerprinting, and finding that even
very sophisticated users cannot protect themselves without significant trade-offs in terms of website
functionality).
129. Inge Graef, Mandating Portability and Inoperability in Online Social Networks: Regulatory and
Competition Law Issues in the European Union, 39 TELECOMMS. POL’Y 509-10, 512 ( 2015).
130. See Lancieri & Sakowski, supra note 14, at 155.
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computer systems and databases.131 Second, while legally mandated interoperability
may enable consumer exit in some markets, the required sharing of personal data can
harm personal privacy. Interoperability is complex and costly, and research has
shown that large bodies of anonymized personal data can be reidentified.132 At the
same time, the value of databases is their volume, complexity, and time-sensitivity.
On the one hand, an interoperability system based on consent faces the same
collective action challenges of data portability. On the other hand, a system that
relies on differential privacy or other similar privacy preserving protocols to enable
the mandatory sharing of personal data will probably be so restricted that it will not
effectively promote exit.133
Voice only functions if consumers can threaten exit. However, many data
markets tend to monopoly, allowing companies to impose unfavorable data
collection and processing terms, notwithstanding consumer preferences. 134
Facebook, for instance, has been condemned in both Germany and Italy for such
practices.135
Data collection and processing is complex, but the following example helps
convey how information asymmetries and market concentration might prevent
consumers from fully exercising exit and voice in data markets. To help contact
tracing programs during the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.K. government asked
restaurants to keep a record of the names and cellphone numbers of consumers.

131. Facebook, for example, has previously leveraged federal criminal law to prevent the development
of a potential competitor in social network markets called Power Ventures, whose goal was to create an
interoperable meta-social network. See Thomas E. Kadri, Essay, Digital Gatekeepers, 99 TEX. L. REV.
951, 971-74 (2021). The legality of Facebook’s very strict interpretation of federal anti-hacking laws is
currently under discussion, in particular after the Supreme Court’s decision in Van Buren v. United States.
In that case, the Court adopted a narrower interpretation of when violations of access rights (or when a
practice “exceeds authorized access”) lead to a violation of federal laws. However, the Court refused to
rule on whether its interpretation extended to violations of private companies’ terms of service (as opposed
to public uses, the case in question), leaving a legal limbo. Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648,
1659 n.8 (2021).
132. See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1716 (2010) (describing how new methods made reidentifying
databases much easier); Luc Rocher et al., Estimating the Success of Re-Identifications in Incomplete
Datasets Using Generative Models, 10 NATURE COMMC’NS 1, 2-3 (2019) (stating that “numerous
supposedly anonymous datasets have recently been released and re-identified” and estimating that their
model can leverage an incomplete database of 1% of the U.S. population to reidentify almost 90% of the
population).
133. See Daniel Kifer et al., Guidelines for Implementing and Auditing Differentially Private
Systems 1, 7-8 (May 14, 2020) (on file with arXiv.org) (describing the restricted “privacy budget” that is
essential to ensure that personal data remains anonymized in Facebook’s Social Sciences One
project). Effective anonymization requires restricting access to data, but this restricted access would not
help promote competition.
134. See Acquisti et al., supra note 48, at 456. See generally Dina Srinivasan, The Antitrust Case
Against Facebook: A Monopolist’s Journey Towards Pervasive Surveillance in Spite of Consumers’
Preference for Privacy, 16 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 39 (2019) (describing how Facebook reflected at least
some consumer privacy concerns while social media markets were competitive but stopped doing so once
it dominated the market).
135. Filippo Lancieri & Caio Mario S. Pereira Neto, Designing Remedies for Digital Markets: The
Interplay Between Antitrust and Regulation, J. OF COMPETITION L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2022). See
generally Kerber & Zolna, supra note 85.
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Some restaurant staff used this information to harass female customers by sending
messages asking them out on dates.136 This was a clear violation of GDPR
requirements, such as specific consent for data processing or purpose limitations, and
of the obligation to fully inform consumers under the CCPA (had this taken place in
California). In theory, consumers could rely on markets as an enforcement
mechanism that can punish the violating restaurants—and this is independent from
the legal characterization of data privacy as a fundamental right (in the EU) or as a
largely consumer right (in the US).137 Consumers could demand that management
fire the harasser (voice), or they could go to different restaurants and force the
violating restaurant to go out of business (exit). However, data can be easily shared
without the consumer’s knowledge. Any restaurant staff can easily copy the
consumer’s name and telephone number or even send it to a friend without the
consumer knowing. If consumers provided their information to different restaurants,
they would not know which establishment to punish unless the wrongdoer revealed
themselves. Similarly, if only one restaurant exists in their city, consumers have no
exit options. Owners can ignore complaints and force consumers to choose between
discounting the violation or avoiding the restaurant altogether.
The complexity of data markets aggravates information asymmetries and market
concentration concerns. Consumers share similar data with multiple providers
without even knowing that their data is being collected and, ultimately, they may
need to decide between sharing personal data or giving-up the use of their
smartphones, online search engines, or digital mapping services altogether. Under
such circumstances, markets do not work as a mechanism to ensure that companies
reflect the privacy preferences of consumers.

136. Donia Waseem & Joseph Chen, Contact Tracing: Why Some People are Giving False Contact
Details to Bars and Restaurants, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 10, 2020), http://theconversation.com/
contact-tracing-why-some-people-are-giving-false-contact-details-to-bars-and-restaurants-143390
[https://perma.cc/X3CD-NMAV].
137. The strength of markets as an enforcement mechanism is independent from discussions on what
types of data processing activities are a violation of the data protection rights of citizens in the EU or of
consumers in the US. By characterizing data privacy as a fundamental right, European nations removed
from consumers the ability to contract in relation to certain aspects of privacy, increasing the realm of
potential violations. For example, purpose limitation is an un-waivable right that companies must respect
whenever they are processing personal data, independent of whether they are in direct contact with citizens
or not (the consumer cannot “consent” them away). On the other hand, the consumer-driven nature of
data protection in the U.S. decreases the helm of potential violations—companies may obtain direct
consent to process personal data in a manner that is much broader than what is allowed in the EU and
without the need to respect data minimization principles (for example). This distinction, however, should
not impact the theoretical effectiveness of markets as an enforcement mechanism. If citizens/consumers
consistently switch suppliers to more privacy preserving alternatives, they will effectively increase data
privacy notwithstanding its legal characterization as a fundamental right or as a consumer good. For more
information on how data privacy violations are characterized between Europe and the U.S., see Joris Van
Hoboken, From Collection to Use in Privacy Regulation? A Forward-looking Comparison of European
and U.S. Frameworks for Personal Data Processing, in EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES OF BIG DATA 231,
233-34, 243-46 (1 ed. 2016).
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B. Torts
1. Tort Liability as a Complement to Market Forces
Tort-based statutory causes of action can complement markets by ensuring that
companies account for the preferences of consumers without many of the downsides
of top-down and command-and-control public regulation.
Tort liability has many virtues. It directly empowers consumers by allowing for
decentralized and often low-cost enforcement.138 Damages encourage users to
monitor companies and bring violators to court.139 Moreover, when coupled with
fee-sharing arrangements and collective redress mechanisms (such as class actions
or punitive damages), tort liability can sometimes overcome the problems of
information asymmetries or low value claims. Injunctions and damage awards may
force powerful companies—including monopolies—to internalize consumer
preferences by compelling or making it unprofitable for corporations to violate the
law.140
In theory, consumers can rely on different torts such as intrusion upon seclusion,
public disclosure of private facts, or even unjust enrichment to safeguard their
privacy. Modern data protection laws, however, go far beyond these general torts
and establish specific data rights that can be a concrete foundation for the statutory
torts that complement markets in promoting consumers’ preferences. 141 The CCPA
and the GDPR, for example, grant consumers a different combination of individual
rights, such as: (i) the right to data rectification and erasure, (ii) the right to opt-out
of data sales (CCPA), (iii) the right to be forgotten (GDPR), (iv) the right to be
notified about data breaches, (v) the right to object to the processing of some forms
of data, and (vi) the right to withdraw consent.142 These are paired with general
commands that consumers should be entitled to receive “full compensation” for
harms suffered (GDPR), or to obtain injunctions and claim statutory damages against

138. See Peter Cane, Tort Law as Regulation, 31 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 305, 316 (2002).
139. Id.
140. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 104, at 124 (stressing how tort law can help overcome market failures
by making some claims actionable and relying on torts as private enforcement).
141. Chander et al., supra note 3, at 1752 (explaining how the GDPR and the CCPA share “the core
elements of a number of additional individual rights (though they differ in the details)”). There are many
differences between the individual rights described in the GDPR and those described in the CCPA. See
generally id. at 1755-62. While the CCPA grants users a series of rights, it does not pair them with the
capacity to directly enforce these rights through private rights of action. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(c)
(effective until Jan. 1, 2023). This Article focuses on how abstract legal rights are enforced on the ground,
highlighting the separation between laws outlining a type of concrete harm that could qualify as a statutory
tort (such as the right to sue when a company prevents the consumer from accessing their data, and failing
to allow them to correct information in the company’s database) and laws that remove independent
enforcement powers from the consumer—a strategy that hampers the tort system as an effective
enforcement mechanism. This separation is explained by Justice Alito in the majority ruling in Spokeo:
Congress is well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III requirements . . . .
Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically
satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to
authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016).
142. See supra Section I.A.
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some violations of the law (CCPA). 143 Because of the GDPR, citizens harassed by
restaurant staff can go to court to obtain injunctions or collect damages for violations
of their data protection rights—a complement to exit and voice.
However, there are downsides to relying on statutory torts as a mechanism to
enforce consumer preferences. First, and most importantly, torts suffer from many
of the same information asymmetries that plague markets: if goods are so complex
and opaque that consumers or their attorneys cannot identify violations or cannot
prove that a violation took place, then the tort system will not work as intended.144
In addition, torts are plagued by agency problems in the definition of the tort, 145 and
courts sometimes struggle to establish causation, calculate damages, or address
negative externalities that go beyond harm to a single individual. 146 Market power
may also undermine torts as firms design more opaque products and leverage their
deep pockets to hire the best lawyers and economic consultants, prolong the
discovery process, and generally raise the costs of litigation.
These shortcomings are not inevitable, instead they depend on the design of the
judicial system and the statutory tort. Yet, an analysis of the GDPR and the CCPA
reveals important obstacles that prevent both common law and statutory torts from
becoming effective data protection enforcement mechanisms. This is because
lawmakers fail to consider how information asymmetries, market power, and other
hurdles undermine data-related statutory torts when designing these laws.
2. Information Asymmetries and Market Power Undermine the CCPA
Tort liability has historically been a weak mechanism to safeguard the data
protection preferences of consumers in the U.S. Many U.S. courts deny Article III
standing or actual recovery in privacy violation or data breach lawsuits for lack of a
cognizable harm.147 Privacy class action lawsuits normally target a couple of statutes
that allow statutory damages. These class actions face many problems around
conflicts of interest between lawyers and consumers.148 While the CCPA and CPRA
could have addressed these shortcomings, some of the same information
asymmetries that plague exit and voice also negatively impact tort enforcement
under these Acts.
143. GDPR, supra note 1, arts. 78-79; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150 (effective until Jan. 1, 2023).
144. See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 363
(1984) (listing barriers to effective compensation through tort liability: dispersed harms, lack of economic
incentive to sue, discovering the harm, establishing causality, and market power).
145. Torts may reflect the preferences of only a subset of consumers or even of parties other than
consumers. For example, mandatory rules may lead to higher quality and higher price combinations that
exclude poorer consumers. See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulatory Techniques in Consumer
Protection: A Critique of European Consumer Contract Law, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 109, 113 (2013);
Waldman, supra note 55, at 793-98 (describing how legal endogeneity is a problem in data protection).
146. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 104, at 125-26.
147. Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach Harms, 96
TEX. L. REV. 737, 739 (2018); see also Ben-Shahar, supra note 104, at 126-28. These refusals are bound
to become stricter after TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez. 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) (holding that the mere
existence of inaccurate information or lack of notice cannot qualify as a concrete harm for purposes of
Article III standing, even if affirmed by specific statutes).
148. Marc Rotenberg & David Jacobs, Enforcing Privacy Rights: Class Action Litigation and the
Challenge of Cy Pres, in ENFORCING PRIVACY 307, 315 (D. Wright & P. De Hert eds., 2016).
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An effective private litigation system requires consumers to be aware that
violations took place. Although this may be easy in the data security realm (given
that data breach notifications provide consumers with clear warnings), this is not the
case for rights that limit the collection and processing of personal data. 149 If
information asymmetries, opacity, and externalities prevent consumers from
understanding what is being done with their data and trigger exit and voice, they also
prevent consumers from litigating these matters.
The American class action system is structured to circumvent this problem. The
practice of grouping claims allows for the pooling of resources and increases the
sophistication of plaintiffs, enabling plaintiffs to take advantage of the extensive civil
discovery process in the U.S. However, the complexity and opacity of data markets
and the market power of digital platforms undermine data protection class actions by
enabling companies to impose terms of use that minimize their liability, design more
complex interfaces that hinder characterization of harm, and generally increase the
cost of litigation. Not only must plaintiffs hire experts and conduct lengthy
investigations to discover violations, but they do so knowing that the other party has
nearly endless resources to fight their claim.
Indeed, with the potential exception of the “do not sell my data” button, most of
the CCPA’s consumer data rights remain directly linked to the companies’ terms of
use.150 This allows companies to draft their terms of use in a way that hinders or
blocks tort lawsuits by allowing for widespread data collection and processing or by
requiring class waivers or mandatory arbitration (among other methods).151 The
designed complexity and opacity of data collection and processing means that data
harms are neither immediate nor visible,152 making it even harder for parties to
survive a motion to dismiss, certify a class, or prove the causation necessary to
trigger liability. In theory, the CCPA statutory damages could provide courts with
guidelines for harm calculations and become an important incentive to encourage
sophisticated plaintiffs to file the expensive class action lawsuits that dominate this
field. However, the CCPA’s statutory damages are mostly a failed opportunity
because: (i) they only apply to data breach litigation and not to core data protection
rights like the “do not sell my data” feature; (ii) data breach claims are overseen by
the Attorney General of California, who may take over the case or simply block
consumers from moving forward;153 and (iii) they still require plaintiffs to prove
some actual harm before they can claim the minimum damages. 154
149. See supra Section I.A.
150. This is a widespread practice among large U.S. companies. See Imre Stephen Szalai, The
Prevalence of Consumer Arbitration Agreements by America’s Top Companies, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
ONLINE 233, 234 (2019) (finding that eighty-one Fortune 100 companies used arbitration agreements in
connection with consumer transactions between 2010 and 2018, and seventy-eight included class action
waivers); Rotenberg & Jacobs, supra note 148, at 313-17 (discussing how class action waivers or
mandated arbitration clauses have undermined data protection enforcement). See generally Waldman,
supra note 55 (explaining that companies can evade legal liability by modifying terms of use and relying
on other forms of hollow compliance).
151. Id.
152. Ben-Shahar, supra note 104, at 125.
153. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(b)(2), (3) (effective until Jan. 1, 2023).
154. Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 627 (2004); see also Davis & Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 63, at 68283 (discussing how expectation damages and other techniques that discourage inefficient breaches in data
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Importantly, the CPRA also continues to prevent consumers from directly
litigating the core data protection rights that are outlined in the law. 155 Ironically,
both the CPRA and CCPA aim to safeguard consumers’ online privacy by
establishing new data protection rights, but then prevent consumers from directly
enforcing most of those rights in court, which precludes the tort system from working
as a complementary enforcement mechanism.
Returning to the simple restaurant example from above, if consumers do not
know that their name and telephone number are being illegally shared, nor which
restaurant shared their data, they will not file a lawsuit. Even if consumers are aware
that it was restaurant X that shared their information, the small value of potential
claims may prevent them from litigating altogether. Courts can dismiss the lawsuit
or refuse to provide damages by stating that simply receiving a text message is not a
cognizable harm. The restaurant may also prevent the lawsuit by requiring that
before consumers receive drinks, they tick an “I agree” box (likely on page thirty)
stating that they consent to their name and telephone number being used for any
purpose the restaurant sees fit, and that they waive their rights to a class action and
agree to private arbitration to resolve disputes. A wealthy restaurant can further
discourage lawsuits by hiring the best lawyers and economic experts and by
prolonging discovery and appeals. Finally, consumers in a one-restaurant town may
not file claims because they are fearful that the aggravated restaurant owner will
refuse their patronage in the future.
The restaurant is a stylized example. Most data collection and processing takes
place in a more complex and opaquer world filled with intermediaries. In real life,
the consumer would not receive a text message from the restaurant. Instead, the
consumer would receive it from a call center that bought their information from a
marketing agency that, in turn, bought their information from the restaurant.
Nonetheless, this simple illustration showcases the many limitations of data
protection torts. Indeed, even after the CCPA came into force, high-profile data
protection class action lawsuits filed in California did not rely on the Act, but rather
relied on other legislation aimed at protecting the safety of private communications,
such as the Federal Wiretap Act or the California Invasion of Privacy Act. 156
3. Information Asymmetries and Market Power Undermine the GDPR
The GDPR faces different but equally important challenges. Data related tort
lawsuits have historically faced large problems in the EU. For example, although
Directive 95/46 (the pre-GDPR data protection legislation) created a range of
specific data protection rights, issues related to standing, causation, and damages

privacy do not accomplish their goals if breaches of data contracts are difficult to detect, prove, or
ascertain). See generally Solove & Hartzog, supra note 31 (discussing legal changes that would be
necessary to increase private litigation of data breach harms).
155. Section 1798.150 on direct consumer lawsuits continues to apply solely to data security violations,
while section 1798.155 only allows for administrative enforcement of other provisions. See CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 1798.150, 1798.155 (effective Jan. 1, 2023).
156. See, e.g., Complaint at 34, Brown v. Google LLC, No. 20-CV-03664, 2021 U.S. Dist. WL 949372
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2021); Complaint at 39, Rodriguez v. Google LLC, No. 20-CV-04688, 2021 WL
2026726 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2021).
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prevented consumers from obtaining effective enforcement of those rights. 157
Although the GDPR significantly improved the old status-quo,158 it also missed
opportunities to spur a robust personal data-related tort litigation system.
First, the concerns about information asymmetries and limited consumer
awareness that plague data-related torts may be even more pressing under the GDPR
because European jurisdictions host fewer sophisticated intermediaries, such as the
data privacy NGOs and class-action plaintiffs that exist in the U.S.159 Further,
European jurisdictions normally lack extensive civil discovery. The GDPR enables
not-for-profit bodies, organizations, or associations specifically created for this
purpose to represent consumers,160 and this, together with broader notions of what is
characterized as harm, has been deemed as a way to enable civil litigants to overcome
standing challenges in litigation.161 Yet, it is ultimately up to member states to
determine specific standing rules. The GDPR also leaves some discretion in terms
of court selection.162
Details around who has the power to sue, the resources of the organizations
involved, which courts have jurisdiction, and which laws are applicable are key for
an effective private litigation system. There is vast scholarship in the U.S. about
strategic litigation and claim preclusion in class action lawsuits. 163 These strategies
are known to undermine enforcement of data protection rights. 164 In the EU,
consumers have stronger protections against the strategic use of jurisdiction,
arbitration, and class action waivers.165 However, until the system is fully in place—
including the passage and effective implementation of the much discussed EU
Collective Redress Directive—the risks of abuse remain.
Another potential drawback is in the calculation of damages. The GDPR
establishes that persons should be compensated for “material and non-material

157. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 18, at 93-94 (describing how the former data protection directive had
a gap between legal principles and their practical enforcement, and how the GDPR’s main innovation is
making enforcement more effective).
158. Id. at 94.
159. Some European intermediaries do exist, such as the NOYB (noyb.eu), an organization founded
by privacy activist Max Schrems, and the La Quadrature du Net (laquadrature.net), founded by French
activists. However, these organizations have limited funding. See discussion infra Section III.A.
160. GDPR, supra note 1, art. 80, recital 142.
161. See Karlijn van den Heuvel & Joris van Hoboken, The Justiciability of Data Privacy Issues in
Europe and the U.S., in RESEARCH ON PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION LAW (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at 97-98).
162. See GDPR, supra note 1, art. 79 (establishing that a lawsuit may be filed in the courts of the
member state where the company is established or where the consumer resides); GDPR, supra note 1, art.
81, recital 144 (establishing that when courts identify multiple proceedings based on a similar fact pattern,
parties may request that their cases be consolidated by the court where the first complaint was filed).
163. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 746
(2005) (discussing conflicts of interest with plaintiff’s counsel in rapidly securing settlements that
preclude the class in exchange for generous fees).
164. Rotenberg & Jacobs, supra note 148, at 316 (providing examples of this problem).
165. Julian Nowag & Liisa Tarkkila, How Much Effectiveness for the EU Damages Directive?
Contractual Clauses and Antitrust Damages Actions, 57 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 433, 466-70 (2020)
(exploring how the Brussels Regulation and the Unfair Contract Terms Directive protect consumers
against contractual clauses which impede the effectiveness of EU laws by establishing mandatory
jurisdiction or arbitration and denying participation in class actions).
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damages” arising from privacy violations.166 The problem with this is that the case
law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in this area is sparse. 167 Again,
information asymmetries associated with the complexity and opacity of data
protection make it harder for consumers to prove standing, demonstrate causation,
or calculate damages, thus undermining the tort system. Some scholars have stressed
how private litigation under the GDPR may face at least three important hurdles: (i)
identifying who is the controller of the information, (ii) demonstrating the
performance of an illegal act by the controller, and (iii) demonstrating causality
between the processing of the personal data and damages to the individual
involved.168
Economic power of companies is another barrier. For example, a previous study
on the lack of private litigation under Directive 95/46 indicated that consumers were
unaware of most violations, but also that they feared negative consequences from the
large companies they relied on if they filed complaints. 169 If consumers cannot
credibly threaten to file complaints, tort liability will not force companies to comply
with consumer preferences. Data privacy litigation is also bound to be expensive, as
lawsuits might involve significant market monitoring, technical preparation, and
discovery to ascertain when the opaque data practices of companies are illegal.
Unless national laws or European courts award meaningful material and nonmaterial damages for data protection violations, private litigation may not be worth
the cost.170 However, the GDPR does not require minimum statutory damages,
punitive damages, or other forms of increased compensation that can encourage
sophisticated intermediaries to start costly investigations and file lawsuits.
Accordingly, it will be up to member states to establish the value of potential
damages.
Ultimately, there is a reasonable risk that the GDPR private litigation system is
structured similarly to the European antitrust private litigation system, where the
bulk of lawsuits take place only after the government has found undertakings to be
in violation of antitrust laws.171 Moreover, the EU Damages Directive for

166. GDPR, supra note 1, art. 82. Recital 146 complements Article 82 by establishing that “[t]he
concept of damage should be broadly interpreted in the light of the case-law of the European Court of
Justice in a manner which fully reflects the objectives of this Regulation.” GDPR, supra note 1, recital
146.
167. Johanna Chamberlain & Jane Reichel, The Relationship Between Damages and Administrative
Fines in the EU General Data Protection Regulation, 89 MISS. L.J. 667, 679-80 (2020) (stressing how the
ECJ has not decided any case on the application of Article 82 and that it will be up to each member state
to ensure that the broad principle is indeed effective).
168. Brendan Van Alsenoy, Liability Under EU Data Protection Law: From Directive 95/46 to the
General Data Protection Regulation, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & E-COMMERCE L. 271, 275, 28283 (2016) (describing the challenges of assessing civil liability in Directive 95/46 and stressing how the
GDPR might alleviate those problems by shifting the burden of proof after the data subject has
demonstrated prima facie harm).
169. Golla, supra note 61, at 73.
170. See Nowag & Tarkkila, supra note 165, at 471-72 (stressing how the small value of awards is a
disincentive for individual consumers to pursue antitrust lawsuits).
171. Id. at 457 (asserting that follow-on antitrust claims are likely the most common in the EU). As
discussed below, antitrust regulation systems also face significant hurdles in terms of information
asymmetries and the potential small value of claims.
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competition law violations has so far failed to spur consumer-driven private
litigation.172 These are bad omens for the success of GDPR private litigation, as not
only is antitrust a more mature enforcement system but the consumer-to-business
nature of data protection laws limits company-driven litigation. Whenever European
online privacy NGOs discover violations, they usually file complaints before EU
regulators rather than suing companies in court—showcasing the weakness of the
tort system. Indeed, when asked why NOYB would not file complaints directly in
court, Max Schrems, the NGO’s head and a renowned privacy activist, stressed that:
(i) NGOs do not have the necessary evidence, and European courts lack the
investigative powers, that would allow them to file a strong case; (ii) going to court
is extremely expensive in most countries, and NGOs lack resources; (iii) loser-pay
principles may mean that a loss kills the organization; and (iv) regulators are paid to
enforce laws, so they should perform their institutional role.173
Tort liability as a mechanism to promote legal compliance will certainly be
weaker in a system where private parties are subordinate to regulators than in one
that relies on a mix of public and private litigation. That is because in this subsidiary
system the enforcement of legal rights is no longer decentralized and directly in the
hands of consumers, rather it is in the hands of government regulators. As a result,
tort liability is at risk of becoming merely a way to increase the deterrence value of
public fines, rather than the independent enforcement mechanism it initially was.
Moreover, as tort liability gets closer to regulatory enforcement, it incorporates the
virtues and shortcomings of public regulation.
C. Regulatory Enforcement
1. Command-and-Control Regulation as a Third Enforcement Mechanism
The government’s use of coercive or fining powers to enforce command-andcontrol regulations is a third and important mechanism to ensure that markets reflect
consumer preferences.174 Regulatory enforcement represents a decision by
governments to remove consumers from the direct determination of quality and
pricing in markets, replacing them with commands that impose specific obligations,
minimum levels of quality, maximum prices, and other substitutes. In essence,
regulatory enforcement is the combination of three components: (i) setting standards
of behavior, (ii) monitoring compliance with those standards, and (iii) enforcing the
standards against those in non-compliance.175 All three are non-trivial, so
172. Id. 471-72 (discussing what prevents consumers from directly litigating antitrust violations).
173. Stanford Univ., Max Schrems on Transatlantic Data Sharing, Digital Rights and Global Policy,
ZOOM, https://stanford.zoom.us/rec/play/u0ZTx-ajBIfgu5Q6HvRNriV8iJoRb0CkILkstaqmE-kgZDwz
wkbsOdhpakCuE2iwUJbXgkhx2MFS45BB.8v693c2ZwpR7mv97?continueMode=true&_x_zm_rtaid=
9ga19Vj_RtSjNcX2pziG-w.1629137625021.6ccbaac8b42692120359f858ceb2b98f&_x_zm_rhtaid=942
[https://perma.cc/7SUZ-HRAY] (last visited Dec. 23, 2021); see Nicholas Vinocur, “We Have a Huge
Problem”: European Regulator Despairs Over Lack of Enforcement, POLITICO (Dec. 27, 2019),
https://www.politico.eu/article/we-have-a-huge-problem-european-regulator-despairs-over-lack-ofenforcement/ [https://perma.cc/H2P3-EYF7] (describing how EU privacy advocates have been filing
complaints before regulators, not courts).
174. See Kuenzler, supra note 84, at 440-41; Shavell, supra note 144, at 373-74.
175. Cane, supra note 138, at 312-13.
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governments create bureaucracies dedicated to fulfilling these tasks. Regulators
issue rules, conduct investigations, order companies to change behavior, and impose
fines to force even the largest businesses to comply with legal and regulatory
commands.176
Online privacy laws have long relied on regulators as complements to markets
and tort liability to ensure that companies reflect consumer preferences.177 Recent
statutory and regulatory changes have further strengthened public enforcement. For
example, both the GDPR and the CCPA require public authorities to define the
content of many data protection rights and effectively enforce those rights.178 The
newly passed CPRA brings California closer to the EU with the creation of the
California Privacy Protection Agency—an independent public bureaucracy
responsible for enforcing the CCPA starting in January 2023.179 Both EU data
protection agencies and their Californian counterpart have the power to impose
billions of dollars in fines for non-compliance, and to order companies to change
their behavior.180
The option for public regulation, however, leads to important changes that can
negatively impact enforcement dynamics. Two are noteworthy. First, the
enforcement system now faces two agency problems. Not only do consumers lose
their power to establish the content of regulations, as in torts, but they also lose
control over when to enforce violations because a governmental employee has
discretion to decide when to act. This opens new avenues for regulatory capture, or
conflicts of interest between governments (agents) and consumer (principals).
Second, the centralization of monitoring and enforcement increases administrative
costs and creates the risk that the system may become under-resourced because the
government may refuse to fund the costly and complex bureaucracies necessary to
properly enforce the regulations.
These two problems are typical of regulatory regimes and can be mitigated
through clever institutional design. However, the large information asymmetries and
market power that characterize many data markets significantly exacerbates these
issues. Indeed, the regulatory systems created through the GDPR and the CCPA lack
different and important institutional solutions that could help alleviate these
concerns.
2. The Risks of Regulatory Capture in Data Protection
George Stigler’s Nobel Prize winning insight was that the preferences of
regulators and consumers may misalign, leading to governmental action that may
176. Id. at 317 (describing command-and-control regulations, monetary fines, and orders as key
enforcement mechanisms).
177. Directive 95/46 required EU member states to establish independent data protection authorities
and the FTC has concluded hundreds of settlements with companies for legal violations. See Solove &
Hartzog, supra note 31, at 610-14 (analyzing 170 FTC privacy complaints, a number that has only
increased since the article was published in 2013).
178. See generally Chander et al., supra note 3, at 1759-61 (comparing the role of regulators in the
GDPR and CCPA).
179. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.199.10 (effective Jan. 1, 2023) (establishing the California Privacy
Protection Agency).
180. See supra Section I.A.
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protect companies while harming consumers. For Stigler, one of the main drivers
of regulation is the demand by politically powerful private interest groups who are
trying to appropriate economic rents.181 Effective governmental capture, however,
is not easy, not least because it requires coordination among industry members who
have private incentives to defect or free ride.182 The scholarship on regulatory
capture has evolved significantly since Stigler wrote his groundbreaking piece. 183
Although many important gaps still remain, we now better understand how agents
must expend political capital to influence regulation, relying on multiple
mechanisms such as cash payments, revolving doors, shaping of the public discourse
through control over the media and academia, the ability to mobilize stakeholders,
and control over the human capital required by regulators.184 Most capture does not
take place through direct payments to corrupt bureaucrats. Rather, it relies on a long
process of persuasion, in which industry players benefit from information
asymmetries and constant interaction, pay consultants and academics, and
strategically use revolving doors to convince the authorities that some specific form
of regulation that protects the company is actually in the public interest. 185
Some have argued that certain key market characteristics encourage private
capture: (i) the concentration within the industry and the alignment of interests
between players, which helps overcome collective action problems; (ii) the opacity
and information asymmetries between the industry and regulators; (iii) the level of
dispersal of the group paying the rent; (iv) the opacity of the rent payment; and (v)
the salience of the topic for the general public.186 Importantly, this literature
indicates that capture is possible, but not that it always happens.187 The risk increases
181. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 57 (1971); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 343
(1974).
182. Posner, supra note 181, at 346; Stigler, supra note 181, at 7, 12.
183. See generally Christopher Carrigan & Cary Coglianese, George J. Stigler, “The Theory of
Economic Regulation”, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CLASSICS IN PUBLIC POLICY AND
ADMINISTRATION 287 (Steven J. Balla et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2015) (describing Stigler’s theory
of economic regulation and the recent progress made in this area); Sam Peltzman, Stigler’s Theory of
Economic Regulation After Fifty Years (Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for L. & Econ., Working Paper
No. 925, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3785342 [https://perma.cc/SJE7LKAZ] (describing gaps that remain in theories of regulatory change and regulatory capture); Andrei
Shleifer, George Stigler’s Paper on Regulation and the Rise of Political Economy, PROMARKET (Apr. 28,
2021), https://promarket.org/2021/04/28/george-stiglers-regulation-political-economy-capture/ [https://
perma.cc/9UJ9-WXB2] (describing the merits of Stigler’s analysis, but also discussing its
incompleteness).
184. Luigi Zingales, Towards a Political Theory of the Firm, 31 J. ECON. PERSPS. 113, 122-126 (2017)
[hereinafter Towards a Political Theory of the Firm]; Luigi Zingales, Preventing Economists’ Capture, in
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 124, 124-24
(Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2013) [hereinafter Preventing
Economists’ Capture].
185. Preventing Economists’ Capture, supra note 184, at 124-25.
186. Towards a Political Theory of the Firm, supra note 184, at 116-19; Carrigan & Coglianese, supra
note 183, at 3-6 (describing why firms may have some advantages that enable them to effectively capture
public policies and what political processes may facilitate and hinder them).
187. Stigler, supra note 181, at 10; Carrigan & Coglianese, supra note 183, at 7. One can understand
the likelihood of a given policy being captured (or the cost of a firm exercising political power against a
given community) as a function of: (i) how much the capture damages the community (the more damages,
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as the specific industry aligns with the characteristics described above. Political
influence is always a matter of degree, and different regulations may well reflect
different combinations of public and private interests.
a. Information Asymmetries and Market Power Increase the Risks of Capture in
Data Protection
The large information asymmetries and market power found in data markets
increases the risk of private capture of these new public enforcement systems. As
discussed above, many key data markets are concentrated around a handful of players
who usually share preferences in favor of extensive data collection. 188 In addition,
rent payments in online privacy are both obscure and distributed. This is because
data collection is complex, often occurs in the background of regular products and
services and has marginal replication and distribution costs. Accordingly,
consumers—a heterogeneous and disorganized group—are usually unaware that
they are giving up personal data. Finally, understanding the role of data in these
industries also requires a particular set of technical skills that are in high demand.
Governments, therefore, compete for talent with a profitable, high-paying industry,
risking revolving doors undermining enforcement and regulatory agencies lacking
the technical personnel to design an effective data protection regime.189 The latter
has already been documented in the EU.190
The same characteristics also increase the risk of public regulatory capture.
Governments and citizens have some conflicting priorities in terms of data protection
when criminal prosecution, national security, and industrial policy are involved. The
surveillance apparatuses of intelligence agencies rely on the processing of personal
data (e.g., communications, locations, and bank transfers) so that limitations on data

the higher the political cost); and (ii) how easy it is for the community to organize to defend its interests
(the easier it is for the community to organize to defend its interests through civil rights associations,
universities, the media, etc., the higher the political cost of capture).
188. See supra Section II.A.3. The potential exception is Apple. However, even Apple has been
criticized for recurrently putting profits above privacy, such as when the company accepted billions of
dollars from Google to secure the default search engine position on Safari--in that situation, it ignored
privacy-friendly alternatives such as DuckDuckGo because Google was willing to pay more to be the
default. Another example is its willingness to share personal data with authoritarian governments as a
condition of operation in countries such as China and Russia when other tech companies refuse to do so.
Apple is also being sued or has been condemned for GDPR violations. Ultimately, Apple may simply not
have enough incentive to advocate for strong industry-wide data protection standards because that would
weaken its promotion of privacy as a commercial strategy. See Ian Bogost, Apple’s Empty Grandstanding
About Privacy, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/01/
apples-hypocritical-defense-data-privacy/581680/ [https://perma.cc/43SB-5W5F]; Jack Nicas et al.,
Censorship, Surveillance and Profits: A Hard Bargain for Apple in China, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/17/technology/apple-china-censorship-data.html [https://perma.cc/
X49A-7GZ5]; Natasha Lomas, Apple’s IDFA Gets Targeted in Strategic EU Privacy Complaints,
TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 16, 2020), https://social.techcrunch.com/2020/11/16/apples-idfa-gets-targeted-instrategic-eu-privacy-complaints/ [https://perma.cc/2LPM-3ZEK].
189. RYAN & TONER, supra note 10, at 3, 6 (finding that almost all EU data protection agencies lack
data scientists).
190. Id.
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collection also mean limitations on the agencies’ success.191 Both the CCPA and the
GDPR explicitly exempt criminal enforcement and national security from their
application192 and law enforcement authorities are attacking end-to-end encryption
in social networks—undermining one of the most important online privacy conquests
of the past decade.193 Three out of five commissioners of the newly created Brazilian
data protection agency are members of the Brazilian armed forces. 194 As perhaps the
best example, the governments of some EU countries have challenged a decision by
the ECJ imposing limits on data retention, alleging, inter alia, that collecting and
withholding data is essential for national security and outside the scope of EU
laws.195
These conflicting interests in data protection are not solely restricted to technical
matters, such as encryption, but include the broader organization of the industry. It
is reasonable to assume that governments prefer fulfilling their data access needs by
tapping just a handful of companies with large, comprehensive databases, rather than
having to access many smaller providers. Large, centralized databases are more
reliable, which helps increase the secrecy of the operations (only one backdoor is
needed), and are better for future Artificial Intelligence applications. 196
Governments also likely prefer to concentrate compliance in a single company
established in their jurisdiction rather than in multiple companies based abroad.
The growing economic importance of digital markets pushes for an equally
expanded interconnection between industrial and data policy, which is exacerbated
by the market power of some large digital companies.197 The more personal and non191. Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHIC. L. REV. 245, 251 (2008)
(“Privacy is the terrorist’s best friend.”).
192. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145 (effective until Jan. 1, 2023); GDPR, supra note 1, art. 23.
193. Robert McMillan et al., Barr Presses Facebook on Encryption, Setting Up Clash Over Privacy,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/attorney-general-calls-on-facebook-to-limitmessage-encryption-plans-11570130636 [https://perma.cc/UJ5J-GM2B].
194. Angelica Mari, Military Takes Over Brazil’s National Data Protection Authority, ZDNET (Oct.
23, 2020), https://www.zdnet.com/article/military-takes-over-brazils-national-data-protection-authority/
[https://perma.cc/GEJ4-VMYE].
195. See Laura Kayali, France Seeks to Bypass EU Top Court on Data Retention, POLITICO (Mar. 3,
2021), https://www.politico.eu/article/france-data-retention-bypass-eu-top-court [https://perma.cc/QB3JGR37]; Theodore Christakis & Kenneth Propp, How Europe’s Intelligence Services Aim to Avoid the
EU’s Highest Court—and What It Means for the United States, LAWFARE (Mar. 8, 2021),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-europes-intelligence-services-aim-avoid-eus-highest-court-andwhat-it-means-united-states [https://perma.cc/B7SH-ADDV].
196. DAKOTA FOSTER & ZACHARY ARNOLD, ANTITRUST AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: HOW
BREAKING UP BIG TECH COULD AFFECT THE PENTAGON’S ACCESS TO AI 13, 15, 20 (2020) (arguing that
(i) “data is a core ingredient” in the development of new AI tools that can bolsters national security, (ii)
data protection requirements, like “siloed” data, can hinder AI innovation, and (iii) the potential break-up
of large tech companies could negatively impact national security by reducing network effects and
deconcentrating data sources necessary for AI developments). The essence of the U.S. PRISM program
(the one denounced by Edward Snowden as a surveillance system that violated civil liberties) was that the
National Security Agency had direct access to the databases of certain trusted and key internet companies,
enabling the surveillance to take place unnoticed.
197. China, for example, explicitly combines data and industrial policy to promote their national
companies, particularly in AI. Hung Tran, Industrial Policy War - Capitalism with Chinese
Characteristics, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/79b242e2-3d21-3bcc-888059e6f34e96c4 [https://perma.cc/T5UW-RKSQ]. In the U.S., whenever companies like Facebook are
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personal data become key inputs for technological development in the digital era, the
more governments concerned with the promotion of national champions may want
to increase rather than restrict access to data. 198 This means that governments may
have important economic incentives to undermine data protection enforcement by
inducing market concentration, data concentration, or more widespread data
collection and processing.
Finally, effective data protection may increase the market power of dominant
digital platforms, worsening these dynamics. This is because of increased
compliance costs and legislation that restricts access to data and concentrates the
remaining data in large providers.199 While access to a large updated database is key
in many digital markets, data protection laws have a general goal of limiting data
collection and processing, which disproportionately impacts smaller companies with
limited direct interaction with consumers.200 It is too early to pass a definitive
judgment, but different studies have found that one side effect of the enactment of
the GDPR has been increased data and market concentration.201 This data protection
and concentration dynamic allows industry players to leverage data protection
regulations in order to protect their dominant position by complying with the law. 202

faced with a new potential regulation, they mention the risk that such protections could displace them in
the race against China. Josh Constine, Facebook’s Regulation Dodge: Let Us, or China Will,
TECHCRUNCH (July 17, 2019), https://social.techcrunch.com/2019/07/17/facebook-or-china/ [https://
perma.cc/U6S9-R8ZF]. The EU recently joined the fray with its new “European Strategy for Data,” which
is predicated on data sharing and the promotion of national players. A European Strategy for Data, EUR.
COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/european-strategy-data [https://perma.cc/32FJ5ZFB] (last visited Dec. 23, 2021).
198. See Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 666-67 (2013)
(emphasizing that the absence of strong privacy laws was key for the development of internet innovation
and the growth of Silicon Valley). As Facebook’s head of Global Affairs stated when pressed about data
protection in an interview: “we don’t hear so much about China, which combines astonishing ingenuity
with the ability to process data on a vast scale without the legal and regulatory constraints on privacy and
data protection that we require on both sides of the Atlantic.” Constine, supra note 197.
199. Gal & Aviv, supra note 113, at 4 (identifying “seven main parallel and cumulative market
dynamics [following the GDPR] that may limit competition and increase market concentration”).
200. See id. at 28.
201. See, e.g., Christian Peukert et al., European Privacy Law and Global Markets for Data 3, 17-19
(Mar. 25, 2020) (on file with SSRN.com); Konstantinos Solomos et al., Clash of the Trackers: Measuring
the Evolution of the Online Tracking Ecosystem 3, 6, 8 (June 2, 2020) (on file with arXiv.org) (generally
finding that Google gained or maintained very high levels of market share after coming into compliance
with the GDPR); Garrett A. Johnson et al., Privacy & Market Concentration: Intended & Unintended
Consequences of the GDPR 2, 21-22 (Jan. 13, 2021) (on file with SSRN.com) (finding that the GDPR led
to an average increase of 17% in market concentration). Evidence suggests that the GDPR led to an
almost 31% decrease in the funding of data-intensive startups in Europe vis-à-vis the U.S. See Jian Jia,
et al., The Short-Run Effects of the General Data Protection Regulation on Technology Venture
Investment, 40 MKTG. SCI. 661, 663 (2021).
202. See Inge Graef et al., Fairness and Enforcement: Bridging Competition, Data Protection, and
Consumer Law, 8 INT’L DATA PRIV. L. 200, 220-22 (2018).
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For example, Google,203 Facebook,204 and Apple205 announced a series of changes to
promote or comply with data protection laws that strengthened their grip on data visà-vis potential competitors. Facebook has also previously leveraged access to its
databases to prevent the development of competitors, potentially in violation of
antitrust laws.206 Many companies are in a data race, and while these changes are
welcome from an online privacy perspective, they further increase data-related
barriers to entry. Stronger, more dominant companies are better resourced to capture
regulators and can more convincingly argue that they are essential to national
economies.
Capture is difficult to identify, but there is growing anecdotal evidence
suggesting that it has already taken place in online privacy. Professor Waldman has
aptly described how privacy laws in the U.S. and the EU are undergoing a process
of legal endogeneity that is highly deferential to industry practice; regulated agents
define what the law means rather than the law constraining what private entities can
do.207 This prevents privacy laws from achieving their substantive goals. In the U.S.,
there have been multiple reports, including by FTC commissioners themselves, that
the FTC, has been unwilling to, or incapable of, standing up to large tech
companies.208 In the EU, the ECJ has been a leading institution in helping to promote
data protection rights by striking down what it considered to be faulty regulations

203. James Hercher, How We Got Here: A Look Back at the Privacy Changes that Reshaped Google,
ADEXCHANGER (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.adexchanger.com/online-advertising/how-we-got-here-alook-back-at-the-privacy-changes-that-reshaped-google/ [https://perma.cc/2W37-4M2Y].
Among
others, Google strengthened its control over data while restricting third-party access by (i) dropping thirdparty cookies in the Chrome browser (forthcoming with the implementation of FLoC), (ii) restricting the
support for pixels on YouTube, (iii) revoking the use of “DoubleClick IDs” that advertisers use for
independent monitoring of online ads, and (iv) restricting third party access to contextual data. Id.
204. Facebook restricted third party access to user data in 2015 and recently the company announced
a pivot to a “privacy-focused platform.” The platform still collects data, but it shares as little as possible
with third parties. Josh Constine, Facebook Is Shutting Down Its API For Giving Your Friends’ Data to
Apps, TECHCRUNCH, https://social.techcrunch.com/2015/04/28/facebook-api-shut-down/ [https://perma
.cc/M2XY-XPEQ] (last visited Dec. 23, 2021); see also Ben Thompson, Facebook’s Privacy Cake,
STRATECHERY (Mar. 7, 2019), https://stratechery.com/2019/facebooks-privacy-cake/ [https://perma.cc
/P5D3-Q2RK].
205. Steve Latham, Why Apple’s Anti-Tracking Move Hurts Everyone . . . But Apple, VENTUREBEAT
(Sept. 12, 2020), https://venturebeat.com/2020/09/12/why-apples-anti-tracking-move-hurts-everyonebut-apple/ [https://perma.cc/4CCC-7MP3].
206. See, e.g., Liza Lovdahl Gormsen & Jose Tomas Llanos, Facebook’s Anticompetitive Lean in
Strategies 68-70 (June 6, 2019) (on file with SSRN.com).
207. Waldman, supra note 55, at 776-77, 792, 816-19.
208. See William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 1011 (2016)
(describing global criticism of an early Facebook settlement with the FTC); Nilay Patel, Facebook’s $5
Billion FTC Fine is an Embarrassing Joke, THE VERGE, (July 12, 2019),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/12/20692524/facebook-five-billion-ftc-fine-embarrassing-joke
[https://perma.cc/FEH3-VKCZ] (stating that Facebook’s stock went up after its settlement with the FTC);
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 58, at 21, 30-31, 37 (reviewing the FTC’s enforcement
actions and noting that all but a handful of cases resulted in settlements and recommending more forceful
action by a stronger regulator); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, NO. 1723083, DISSENTING STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER ROHIT CHOPRA: IN THE MATTER OF GOOGLE LLC AND YOUTUBE, LLC (2019).
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that did not adequately promote data protection.209 The ECJ also previously
determined that EU countries have not safeguarded the independence of their data
protection authorities.210 Other studies have shown that data authorities are reluctant
to impose sanctions for violations, instead preferring to rely on cooperation.211 More
recently, European governments have been accused of using COVID-19 to suspend
GDPR rights212 and of using the GDPR itself as a way to diminish public
accountability.213 There are many complaints from European activists and other EU
regulators that the Irish data protection authority (the leading GDPR enforcer) is
dragging its feet on enforcement because of how important digital markets are to the
Irish economy.214 Facebook famously settled in Ireland partially because of its
favorable regulatory reputation.215 NOYB published a scathing letter accusing the
Irish regulator of being “structurally biased,” and cooperating with Facebook to
purposefully delay the enforcement of the GDPR in order to attract foreign
investment,216 and it has formally accused the agency of corruption for its alleged
attempt to illegally safeguard Facebook’s corporate interests over its statutory

209. For instance, the decision invalidating the EU-U.S. Safe Harbor was grounded in the fact that
regulators did not comply with express legal obligations to monitor transatlantic data transfers, allowing
the industry to freely collect and transfer personal data. The subsequent invalidation of Privacy Shield
also affirmed that the European Commission failed to properly assess whether the data of European
citizens would receive adequate protection if transferred to the U.S. Case C-362/14, Maximilian Schrems
v. Data Prot. Comm’r (Schrems I), ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶¶ 88-90 (Oct. 6, 2015); Case C-311/18, Data
Prot. Comm’r v Facebook Ire. Ltd. (Schrems II), ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶¶ 184-185, 191 (July 16, 2020).
210. See, e.g., C-288/12, Eur. Comm’n v. Hung., ECLI:EU:C:2014:237 (Apr. 8, 2014); C-614/10, Eur.
Comm’n v. Austria, ECLI:EU:C:2012:631 (Oct. 16, 2012).
211. See Golla, supra note 61, at 73.
212. Many European governments set aside data protection concerns in the fight against COVID-19.
Hungary even suspended the applicability of GDPR rights. See Samuel Stolton, EU Data Watchdog
“Very Worried” by Hungary’s GDPR Suspension, EURACTIV (May 19, 2020), https://www.euractiv.com/
section/data-protection/news/eu-data-watchdog-very-worried-by-hungarys-gdpr-suspension/
[https://
perma.cc/V7Q9-GR44].
213. European countries such as Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia have apparently attempted
to use the GDPR to harass journalists and NGOs who have revealed government wrongdoings. See
ESTELLE MASSÉ, ACCESS NOW, TWO YEARS UNDER THE GDPR: AN IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS
REPORT 17-19 (2020).
214. See Nicholas Vinocur, One Country Blocks the World on Data Privacy, POLITICO (Apr. 24, 2019),
https://www.politico.eu/interactive/ireland-blocks-the-world-on-data-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/4ZCRKV5J]; see also Vincour, supra note 173; Nicole Kobie, Germany Says GDPR Could Collapse as Ireland
Dallies on Big Fines, WIRED UK (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/gdpr-fines-googlefacebook [https://perma.cc/2BN9-YQFP].
215. Karlin Lillington, Ireland’s Regulatory Reputation Encouraged Facebook HQ, IRISH TIMES
(Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/ireland-s-regulatory-reputation-encour
aged-facebook-hq-1.2279283 [https://perma.cc/8Q99-ZU33].
216. Maximilian Schrems, Open Letter to the European Data Protection Authorities, NOYB (May 25,
2020), https://noyb.eu/sites/default/files/2020-05/Open%20Letter_noyb_GDPR.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4AXT-9R3J]. NOYB is also taking legal action against the Irish data protection authority for the same
reasons. See NOYB, Irish High Court Allows Judicial Review to Stop Facebook EU-US Transfers, (Oct.
12, 2020), https://noyb.eu/en/irish-high-court-allows-judicial-review-stop-facebook-eu-us-transfers
[https://perma.cc/NN37-P8HX].
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obligations.217 Indeed, the lack of appropriate resources and initiative by Irish
regulators has been denounced by other European data privacy regulators, 218 leading
commentators to claim that Ireland is a “safe haven for tech giants.”219
b. The Systems Lack Appropriate Counterweights
Although capture is a constant threat to regulatory systems, the discussion above
showcases how a somewhat exceptional combination of market concentration,
complexity, obscurity, consumer dispersion, and the strategic nature of data
exacerbates the possibility of capture in online privacy. Yet, the regulatory systems
put in place by the GDPR and the CCPA lack institutional counterweights—such as
civil oversight, civil lawsuits for failure to act, and competition in enforcement—that
can help fend off undue influences.
Beginning with civil oversight, as Louis Brandeis rightly stated, “[s]unlight is
said to be the best of disinfectants” when it comes to fighting powerful vested
interests.220 Data protection is certainly in the spotlight in Europe and, to a lesser
extent, in the U.S. It is possible then, to design regulatory systems that leverage this
public awareness to offset the risk of capture. However, data protection agencies in
the EU and the U.S. tend to be extremely opaque. The FTC and the California Office
of the Attorney General provide very little public information about ongoing
investigations. They also hardly supply information on the reasons behind the
opening or closing of cases—most of the information relates to cases that were filed
or settled.221 Similarly, many important EU authorities rely on annual reports, press
releases or brief statements to announce the opening or closing of investigations. 222
In particular, stakeholders have complained about the obscurity of the Irish and
Luxembourg data authorities, which are among the most powerful in the EU.223 The
Irish Data Protection Commission does not host even basic transparency mechanisms
such as a page summarizing the status of ongoing cases or a public agenda for
officials.224 As previously discussed, European privacy NGOs accused the agency
of holding numerous confidential meetings with defendants to advise them on how
to comply with the law, while simultaneously withholding most of that information

217. Natasha Lomas, Facebook’s Lead EU Privacy Supervisor Hit with Corruption Complaint,
TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 23, 2021), https://social.techcrunch.com/2021/11/22/facebooks-lead-eu-privacysupervisor-hit-with-corruption-complaint/ [https://perma.cc/W7N7-YQTZ].
218. See generally Kobie, supra note 214.
219. MASSÉ, supra note 213, at 14.
220. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT ch. 5 (1914)
(ebook).
221. For example, the FTC’s annual report on privacy and security provides very little data on ongoing
investigations, cases closed but not pursued, and other relevant data. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY
AND SECURITY UPDATE: 2019 (2019).
222. The Irish Data Protection Commission has data on open and closed investigations and some case
studies but no comprehensible way to access specific information, its reasoning, etc. See generally IRISH
DATA PROT. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT: 2019 (2020).
223. Vincour, supra note 173.
224. See IRISH DATA PROT. COMM’N, https://www.dataprotection.ie/en/who-we-are [https://perma.cc/
5Y89-RA89] (last visited Dec. 23, 2021).
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from complainants and European regulators.225 This lack of transparency impedes
effective civil oversight of the government’s enforcement of privacy laws.
Lawsuits for failure to act are another important mechanism in the fight against
private capture.226 In this area, the GDPR is more advanced than the CCPA and
CPRA. The GDPR requires that authorities investigate complaints filed by data
subjects, inform them of the status of their complaints after three months of the filing,
and allow private parties to file complaints against regulators in case of breach of
this obligation.227 The CCPA and CPRA, on the other hand, have no comparable
provisions. Even the GDPR, however, has important flaws connected with the lack
of agency transparency and the wide discretion regulators retain in deciding how to
handle complaints (complemented by minimum judicial oversight), 228 allowing
agencies to potentially game provisions and delay cases indefinitely. 229
Finally, regulatory systems must always walk a fine line between: (i) relying on
a single, authoritative regulator with the appropriate powers and resources to
challenge dominant businesses; and (ii) relying on multiple regulatory agencies with
overlapping authorities that multiply the number of agents a party must influence to
determine the outcome of a policy, which hinders capture. The GDPR and the CCPA
and CPRA adopt different strategies. The California law allocates all enforcement
of non-data breach violations to the California State Attorney General (or, later, the
California Privacy Protection Agency).230 The GDPR, on the other hand, is enforced
by multiple national data protection authorities and allows for “joint investigations”
between these agencies to solve disputes.231 Although the European dispersion of
enforcement power may be a welcome mechanism to increase accountability, the
GDPR’s creation of a one-stop-shop system reliant on a “lead supervisory
authority,”232 combined with a convoluted system of joint investigations,233
effectively concentrates key EU data protection enforcement in just two regulators
located in Ireland and Luxembourg (countries that are particularly prone to
regulatory capture as they disproportionately benefit from the growth of the digital

225. Schrems, supra note 216, at 3, 8-9.
226. See generally Case C-362/14, Schrems I, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, (Oct. 6, 2015); Case C-311/18,
Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, (July 16, 2020).
227. GDPR, supra note 1, arts. 57(1)(f), 78(2).
228. David Erdos, Accountability and the UK Data Protection Authority: From Cause for Data Subject
Complaint to a Model for Europe? 6 (Univ. of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 14/20, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3521372 [https://perma.cc/FGW3-J6XT].
229. Authorities can simply provide an update that a case is ongoing, and then delay it indefinitely.
This was the issue in the UK when the First-Tier Tribunal decided at least six cases claiming that users
only have a right to object against well-defined procedural violations, not the final outcomes. See id. at 8.
230. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.155 (effective until Jan. 1, 2023).
231. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (on the CCPA); GDPR, supra note 1, arts. 60-62.
232. GDPR, supra note 1, art. 56(1).
233. In GDPR joint investigations, a lead authority can either invite other agencies to a joint
investigation or non-lead authorities may request that the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) include
them in an investigation. GDPR, supra note 1, art. 62(2). If a conflict between the authorities takes place,
the decision by the lead authority prevails, unless two-thirds of the twenty-nine members of the EDPB
vote otherwise. However, even if the EDPB overrules it, the initial lead authority will still adopt the final
decision based on the outcome of the vote. GDPR, supra note 1, art. 65(2).
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economy). 234 This is a serious institutional design flaw that all but nullifies the
benefits of the multiple-enforcer system. Early data indicates that this cooperation
mechanism renders multi-party investigations ineffective235 and has led to
widespread denouncement of Irish authorities as structurally biased against GDPR
enforcement.236
3. Data Authorities are Under a Heightened Risk of Being Chronically
Underfunded
A second key shortcoming of these systems, which are over-reliant on public
enforcement, is the potential lack of resources.237 While this risk is inherent to all
governmental regulations, data protection’s distinctive combination of large
information asymmetries, market power, and broad applicability place data
authorities under a heightened risk of being chronically underfunded.
The GDPR was partially designed to bring data protection closer to antitrust in
terms of enforcement resources, fining capacity, and other regulatory tools. 238
Antitrust and data protection policies share significant concerns around information
asymmetries because both competition and online privacy violations are mostly
hidden from the public view.239 Unlike antitrust, however, data protection laws are
not (mostly) targeted at a small subset of corporations that possess market power.
Rather, they establish a range of complex rights and obligations that apply across the
economy to small and large businesses, non-profit organizations, and even
individuals.240 Small, unknown companies can collect and process a significant
amount of sensitive personal data. Cambridge Analytica is just one example. 241 As

234. See generally Erdos, supra note 228, at 3; MASSÉ, supra note 213, at 13. Both Ireland and
Luxembourg are particularly prone to regulatory capture because they disproportionately benefit from the
growth of the digital economy. For example, Ireland’s fast-growing digital sector is responsible for 13%
of national GDP, 26% of exports, and over 10% of all employment. IRISH BUS. & EMPS.
CONFEDERATION, BREXIT AND THE IRISH TECHNOLOGY SECTOR 13-17 (2019); see also Lillington, supra
note 215, at 4 (noting that Facebook’s Deputy Chief Privacy Officer famously stated that Ireland’s “high
standard” regulatory environment is a key reason why the company is based there).
235. Erdos, supra note 228, at 4 (describing how most authorities lack the budget or staff for jointinvestigations).
236. See Madhumita Murgia & Javier Espinoza, Ireland is ‘Worst Bottleneck’ for Enforcing EU Data
Privacy Law, IRISH TIMES (Sept. 13, 2021), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/ireland-isworst-bottleneck-for-enforcing-eu-data-privacy-law-iccl-1.4672480
[https://perma.cc/E2EW-QVLK]
(reporting on the multitude of criticisms of the Irish Data Protection Commission).
237. Shavell, supra note 144, at 364 (identifying high administrative costs as a key hurdle to the
effectiveness of public regulation).
238. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 18, at 67, 92.
239. In antitrust policy, many violations take place when companies secretly collude to raise prices,
one dominant company redesigns a specific product, one dominant company contracts to exclude a
competitor, or companies in specific sectors merge.
240. See GDPR, supra note 1, art. 4(7); Inge Graef & Sean Van Berlo, Towards Smarter Regulation
in the Areas of Competition, Data Protection and Consumer Law: Why Greater Power Should Come with
Greater Responsibility, 12 EUR. J. RISK REGUL. 691-92 (2020) (stressing how uniform applicability risks
underenforcement in data protection and proposing that regulators privilege actions against large firms).
241. See Nicholas Confessore, Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The Scandal and the Fallout So
Far, N.Y. TIMES (April 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analyticascandal-fallout.html [https://perma.cc/Q7XT-ZU7K] (summarizing the Cambridge Analytica scandal).
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the digital economy grows, the jurisdiction of data protection authorities will expand,
risking that these agents become regulators of a “law of everything.”242 For example,
the FTC pursued a cellphone flashlight app for online privacy violations, 243 the
Austrian data protection authority fined a kebab shop for installing a security camera
that also covered the public street,244 and the Spanish authority issued a warning to a
secondary school student who recorded and posted a video of another minor on
Instagram.245
Data collection’s ubiquitous, opaque, complex, and multi-player nature
significantly decreases the likelihood that these violations will be exposed. In
addition, data protection regulatory regimes lack institutional design solutions that
can help diminish information asymmetries and the cost of detecting violations. For
example, antitrust regimes acknowledged that obscurity and complexity hindered
enforcement, leading jurisdictions around the world to reform their competition laws
to incorporate leniency regimes and mandatory merger notifications as a way to force
or encourage private parties to supply regulators with hard-to-access information.246
Extensive discovery rights and treble damages further encourage private parties to
oversee markets and bring violators to court, increasing the overall resources
dedicated to the discovery of illegal behavior.247 The CCPA, CPRA and GDPR do
not incorporate any similar mandatory “information revealing” solutions in their
regimes.
This somewhat unique combination of a broad mandate, a system not designed
to generate the type of information required for regulatory oversight, and a lack of a
complementary civil society puts significant pressure on the resources that data
authorities need to properly perform their role. Another comparison with antitrust
can help showcase the size of the challenge. European data protection agencies have
grown significantly since the enactment of the GDPR. The Irish Data Protection
Commission grew from 70 to 145 personnel between 2016 and 2021 and the seven
hundred staff of the UK’s Information Commissioner is now larger than the antitrust

242. Nadezhda Purtova, The Law of Everything. Broad Concept of Personal Data and Future of EU
Data Protection Law, 10 L. INNOVATION & TECH. 40, 40-41 (2018).
243. Android Flashlight App Developer Settles FTC Charges it Deceived Consumers, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/12/android-flashlightapp-developer-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived [https://perma.cc/Y5HB-KU5N].
244. Muzayen Al-Youssef, Bislang vier Strafen wegen DSGVO-Verstößen seit Mai, DER STANDARD
(Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.derstandard.de/story/2000092017999/erst-vier-strafen-wegen-dsgvo-seitmai [https://perma.cc/UR76-KN53].
245. See AEPD - PS/00408/2020, GDPRHUB, https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=AEPD_-_PS/00408/
2020&mtc=today [https://perma.cc/9GS3-E559] (last visited Dec. 23, 2021).
246. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING
EFFECTIVE ACTION AGAINST HARD CORE CARTELS 6 (2021) [hereinafter RECOMMENDATION OF THE
COUNCIL] (recommending the establishment of leniency programs that encourage self-reporting of
violations as a backbone of an effective cartel detection system); ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., REVIEW
OF THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING EFFECTIVE ACTION AGAINST HARD CORE
CARTELS 15-17 (2019) [hereinafter REVIEW OF THE RECOMMENDATION] (describing the rise in antitrust
leniency programs around the world in the past twenty years).
247. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SUBMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE OECD ON THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 2-3 (2015).
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division of the FTC, which had 528 full-time staff at the end of 2020.248 Yet, their
workload is all but endless—it took European data protection agencies only eighteen
months to trigger the same amount of EU-wide potential cooperation requests that
their antitrust counterparts issued in more than fourteen years (around 2,500
investigations).249 In the first nine months of GDPR enforcement, European data
protection authorities received 206,326 notifications of potential violations, closing
a total of 37,900 investigations.250 By November 2019, the number of complaints
rose to 275,000, but it only led to 785 fines, most of which are still subject to judicial
review.251 Authorities themselves acknowledged they are overwhelmed with the
workload.252
As a result, governments must continue to devote a growing share of scarce
public funds to an area they might rather not, as enforcing data protection laws can
conflict with some other important priorities such as national security or industrial
policy. Lack of political will means that agencies may be chronically underfunded.
For example, the 2019 budget of the California office of the Attorney General, which
is responsible for overseeing the CCPA, was around $5,000,000, which was only
enough to support an enforcement staff of twenty-three lawyers who are also
responsible for broader consumer protection.253 The FTC has acknowledged that its
lack of resources is undermining its enforcement capacity254 and is preventing the
expansion of its already constrained data protection team (composed of sixty-one
employees in 2020, or 5% of the agency’s total staffing),255 which has been criticized
as insufficient to effectively monitor and enforce data protection laws. 256 The FTC’s
annual budget is around $330,000,000, while the guaranteed funding of the
California Privacy Protection Agency is only $10,000,000.257 In the EU, the Irish
248. See DATA PROT. COMM’R OF IRELAND, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DATA PROTECTION
COMMISSIONER OF IRELAND 2 (2016); DATA PROT. COMM’R OF IRELAND, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DATA
PROTECTION COMMISSIONER OF IRELAND 78 (2020); INFO. COMM’R’S OFFICE, INFORMATION
COMMISSIONER’S ANNUAL REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 2018-19 46 (2019); FED. TRADE
COMM’N, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FISCAL YEAR 2022
49 (2021).
249. Between May 2004 and December 2018, European competition authorities notified the European
Competition Network about the opening of 2,523 antitrust investigations, while European data authorities
triggered 2,542 cooperation requests in just eighteen months. See Statistics, EUR. COMM’N,
https://ec.europa.eu/competition-policy/european-competition-network/statistics_en [https://perma.cc/
4WYE-WSQS] (last visited Dec. 23, 2021); EUR. DATA PROT. BD., 2019 ANNUAL REPORT: WORKING
TOGETHER FOR STRONGER RIGHTS 5, 30 (2020).
250. See EUR. DATA PROT. BD., FIRST OVERVIEW ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GDPR AND the
ROLES AND MEANS OF THE NATIONAL SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES 12 (2019).
251. EUR. COMM’N, supra note 73, at 5, 20.
252. Satariano, supra note 4.
253. Yuri Nagano, California Attorney General Plans Few Privacy Law Enforcement Actions, Telling
Consumers to Take Violators to Court, S.F. PUB. PRESS (May 15, 2019),
https://sfpublicpress.org/news/2019-05/california-attorney-general-plans-few-privacy-lawenforcements-telling-consumers-to-take-violators-to-court [https://perma.cc/EY2B-2ZJX].
254. Leah Nylen, FTC Suffering a Cash Crunch as It Prepares to Battle Facebook, POLITICO (Dec.
10, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/10/ftc-cash-facebook-lawsuit-444468 [https://perma.
cc/VZ5S-22H4].
255. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 248, at 49.
256. STIGLER CTR., STIGLER COMMITTEE ON DIGITAL PLATFORMS: FINAL REPORT 220 (2019).
257. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.199.95 (effective until Jan. 1, 2023).
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Data Protection Commission’s 2019 budget was €15,000,000, and the budget of the
Luxembourg authority was €5,500,000.258 Although most European data protection
authorities stressed the need for a significantly larger budget and personnel to
appropriately enforce their new, expanded legal responsibilities, “almost none of
them received the requested amount” of funding.259
Finalizing the stylized restaurant example, as a third alternative to remedy
potential violations of its data rights, the aggrieved consumer could complain to a
dedicated regulator that their name and phone data had been illegally collected and
processed by a third-party. In this case, however, the consumer cannot enforce the
law directly. First, they would need to convince a public agent to open an
investigation into the matter. The consumer, however, does not know which
restaurant shared their data, so the agent must require all of the restaurants the
consumer visited to disclose whether they were responsible. This means that the
public enforcer must depend on the restaurants to produce the information needed to
enforce the law. The consumer is then only updated every three months that
investigations are ongoing, but there is hardly anything they can do to accelerate the
process. The same public agent, however, oversees data processing in the entire
locality, so it must simultaneously handle thousands of other complaints.
Restaurants also generally refuse to share the information the agent needs to finalize
the case, as they profit from it. In addition, the restaurant industry is key for the
economic development of this specific country, and many restaurants settled in that
country because it has somewhat permissive data use laws. 260 The agent, therefore,
knows that the government does not want to antagonize that industry. After many
years, the regulatory agency issues a fine that amounts to 0.1% of what the restaurant
in question earned in profits in the preceding year. 261 The restaurant still has the
option to appeal the fine before the judiciary, further delaying the enforcement of the
law.
Again, this is a stylized example. Yet, it touches in only some of the challenges
of developing an effective regulatory system for complex data collection and
processing practices. Broad mandates, large information asymmetries, and market
power significantly increase the public resources needed to enforce the laws and
increase the risks of both private and public capture.

258. MASSÉ, supra note 213, at 11.
259. EUR. DATA PROT. BD., supra note 250, at 7.
260. As previously discussed, Ireland’s digital sector is responsible for 26% of the country’s exports
and 10% of its employment. See IRISH BUS. & EMPS. CONFEDERATION, supra note 234, at 13-17; see also
Lillington, supra note 215, at 4.
261. The first fine issued by the Irish data protection authority against Twitter took almost two years
of investigation, despite being a simple case of the company not complying with a seventy-two-hour data
breach notification deadline, which amounted to approximately $550,000, or 0.1%, of Twitter’s 2019
profits. Natasha Lomas, Twitter Fined ~$550K Over a Data Breach in Ireland’s First Major GDPR
Decision, TECHCRUNCH, (Dec. 15, 2020), https://social.techcrunch.com/2020/12/15/twitter-fined-550kover-a-data-breach-in-irelands-first-major-gdpr-decision/ [https://perma.cc/K3W4-V3D6].
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III. NARROWING DATA PROTECTION’S ENFORCEMENT GAP THROUGH
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Regulatory systems must be designed to anticipate implementation challenges
and facilitate monitoring and enforcement. Yet, online privacy laws like the CCPA,
CPRA, and GDPR fail to account for the role of exceptionally large information
asymmetries and market power in undermining markets, torts, and regulatory
enforcement as mechanisms to ensure that companies reflect the data privacy
preferences of consumers. As mentioned in Part I above, it is possible that
compliance will improve as these regimes mature. However, experience shows that
this is not guaranteed.262 Societies are now spending billions of scarce private and
public resources on systems with important flaws. Narrowing data protection’s
enforcement gap will require improving the institutional design of these laws. By
paying more attention to what happens in the shadows of the law, scholars and
policymakers can help ensure not only that these regimes better deliver on their
promises, but also that they do so in a quicker and more cost-effective manner.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide definitive solutions to the
multiple and complex issues identified above. First, most of the solutions would be
jurisdiction specific, requiring changes to different national laws that regulate public
transparency, standing, discovery, causation, trade secret laws, the filing of lawsuits
for failure to act, etc. Second, it is possible that these systems may require a
significant rethinking of their fundamental goals.263 Rather, the objective of this
Article is to learn from the ways more mature regulatory regimes, such as antitrust
and anti-corporate fraud, have tackled the common challenges of large information
asymmetries that undermine legal compliance. If these challenges are not addressed,
it is unlikely that any privacy law will fully deliver on its goals. This focus on
information asymmetries is justified because the antitrust community is already
discussing how to diminish the market power of large digital platforms.264 However,
the equally important role of these asymmetries in undermining data protection
compliance has been largely neglected.
In particular, an improved data protection regulatory system should incorporate
at least three key principles: (i) multiplying available monitoring and enforcement
resources, (ii) bringing violations to the attention of monitors and enforcers, and (iii)
forcing governmental accountability to diminish risks of regulatory capture.
A. Multiplying Monitoring and Enforcement Resources
Not only is the collection and processing of personal data usually taking place
in complex, non-transparent environments, but also the widespread collection and
easy replicability of these data expands the jurisdiction of online privacy laws. As

262. Compliance with Directive 95/46 or the European E-privacy directive has been extremely low,
despite their enactment decades ago. See supra Section I.B.
263. See Waldman, supra note 55, at 825 (discussing other structural changes to privacy laws that
would also be important to help promote compliance).
264. See generally Lancieri & Sakowski, supra note 14 (reviewing diagnosed concerns and potential
remedies).
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seen above, this combination undermines monitoring and enforcement in systems
that rely primarily on regulatory enforcement, like the GDPR and the CCPA.
Important information asymmetries, however, are not exclusive to data
protection, even if they are exacerbated in it. Anti-corporate fraud and antitrust
policies also face challenges in discovering intra-corporate wrongdoing in complex
environments. To help tackle this problem, these regimes have been designed to
encourage sophisticated private organizations that understand the complexity of
corporate practices and denounce violations. For example, a large survey on
corporate fraud lawsuits in the U.S. found that regulators exposed only 20% of
wrongdoing, with the remaining 80% being exposed by employees, the media,
academia, industry analysts, and other sophisticated third-parties.265 The majority of
U.S. antitrust litigation is private, not public.266 Data protection laws should be
equally designed to expand the number of sophisticated private intermediaries—such
as privacy NGOs, independent think-tanks, and class-action plaintiffs—that have the
expertise and resources to comprehend the complexity of data processing and act
alongside public regulators in detecting violations. These sophisticated civil society
intermediaries are also better equipped to constantly monitor regulatory action,
increasing the cost of capturing regulators.
An expansion of these sophisticated private intermediaries requires the
availability of appropriate and independent funding. However, most privacy NGOs
and other similar organizations are supported by grants and donations—an unreliable
and insufficient source of funding for mass oversight.267 An effective online privacy
regulatory system should ensure a consistent, independent source of funding for
these intermediaries, enabling them to invest time and resources into hiring technical
personnel, starting complex and potentially unfruitful investigations, potential
litigation, and better equipping them to resist the temptation of being co-opted by
large corporate donations.268

265. Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2225 (2010).
266. Daniel A. Crane, Toward a Realistic Comparative Assessment of Private Antitrust Enforcement,
63 VAND. L. REV. 341, 343 (2019) (stressing how private antitrust enforcement outstrips public
enforcement by a ratio of at least 10:1).
267. For example, even the most well-known European NGOs, like NOYB and La Quadrature du Net,
have trouble raising resources. NOYB has so far raised only 78% of its €500,000 funding goal for 2020.
NOYB, Our Funding Goal: 2/3 by Supporting Members, https://support.noyb.eu/funding [https://perma.
cc/7UVJ-5P3E] (last visited Dec. 23, 2021). La Quadrature du Net relies on donations for 70% of its
annual budget of around €400,000, but in 2020 they only raised €217,000, and for 2021 they raised even
less—around €140,000. See About Us, LA QUADRATURE DU NET, https://www.laquadrature.net/en/about/
[https://perma.cc/T5JE-UMTE] (last visited Dec. 23, 2021); Rallumez les ombres, faites un don à la
Quadrature du Net, LA QUADRATURE DU NET, https://www.laquadrature.net/donner/ [https://perma.cc/
6MFX-85ZE] (last visited Dec. 23, 2021). In the U.S., the Electronic Privacy Information Center, another
large NGO, had a budget of roughly two million dollars in 2018. See ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS 6 (2018).
268. This is a problem that exists in antitrust. See Tony Romm, Amazon, Facebook and Google Turn
to Deep Network of Political Allies to Battle Back Antitrust Probes, WASH. POST (Jun. 10, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/10/amazon-facebook-google-political-alliesantitrust/ [https://perma.cc/VPV4-AJF3]; Daisuke Wakabayashi, Big Tech Funds a Think Tank Pushing
for Fewer Rules for Big Tech., N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/24/
technology/global-antitrust-institute-google-amazon-qualcomm.html [https://perma.cc/5Z2X-LAGG].
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There are different mechanisms to help ensure that private parties have
incentives to specialize in this field. For example, the U.S. legal system awards
treble damages for antitrust violations to encourage private litigation—a mechanism
that the Supreme Court has said works as “a chief tool in the antitrust enforcement
scheme”269 that encourages litigants to serve as “private attorneys general.”270 This
is certainly an important mechanism to consider, even if it has limitations and is of
difficult acceptance abroad.271
Jurisdictions should consider creating a system of recurrent grants that is linked
to how well intermediaries perform their role as an institutional design alternative.
These grants would be funded by the resources raised from fines and damage awards
associated with data protection violations and would be distributed according to both
a direct and an indirect method. Under the direct method, the laws could establish
that private parties such as NGOs, data-focused investigative news agencies (such as
The Markup), or other intermediaries, are entitled to a small percentage of: (i) the
fines that result from an investigation that started from a private complaint, or (ii)
the damages awarded in tort litigation where these organizations represent
consumers.
Under the indirect method, a panel of public authorities and civil society
representatives could annually distribute grants to NGOs, universities, think tanks,
dedicated investigative news agencies, and other private organizations that are
engaged in projects aimed at improving data protection. This mechanism has several
advantages. For example, it (i) can ensure long-term funding for these organizations,
rather than large lump-sum awards followed by periods without any resources; (ii)
can be implemented without changes that impact the perceived justice of tort law;
and (iii) can directly connect funding to effective monitoring, minimizing
administrative costs.
Again, antitrust policies provide an example as to how the indirect method
would work. Brazilian antitrust laws require that fines imposed by the Brazilian
competition authority are allocated to a public fund aimed at protecting the diffuse
interests of citizens. Between 2016-2020, the fund raised approximately BRL
3,000,000,000 (approximately USD 575,000,000).272 This fund is managed by a
council composed of seven career civil servants and three civil entity representatives
who are selected for a renewable appointment of two years.273 The fund annually
publishes public calls for applications through which universities, NGOs, and even
other entities can request resources to support their activities in defense of the public

269. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635 (1985).
270. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972).
271. See generally Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 673
(2010) (discussing limitations in American private antitrust enforcement).
272. Using the Exchange rate of USD 1:5.19 BRL on December 31, 2020. See CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO
PENAL [C.P.P.] [CODES] art. 28 (Braz.); see also Arrecadação, MINISTÉRIO DA JUSTIÇA E SEGURANÇA
PÚBLICA, DIREITOS DIFUSOS (Aug. 16, 2021), https://www.gov.br/mj/pt-br/assuntos/seus-direitos/
consumidor/direitos-difusos/arrecadacao-1/arrecadacao2 [https://perma.cc/CJ4G-DMK5] (providing
resources regarding the resources of the funds).
273. Decreto No. 1,306, de 9 de Novembro de 1994, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.] de 9.11.1994
(Braz.).
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interest.274 For example, in 2019 the fund awarded forty-six long-term grants.275 The
changes made to the CPRA also serve as an important step in this direction. Section
1798.160(b)(2)(B) of the CPRA ensures that 9% of the Consumer Privacy Fund that
collects CCPA damage awards—a majority of which goes to the Californian
treasury—will be distributed by the California Privacy Protection Agency as grants
to civil society and law enforcement.276 The 3% that would go to NGOs, however,
seems insufficient to bring monitoring resources to a point where they can actually
diminish the high levels of information asymmetries in data protection. 277
Monitoring resources should be increased, and European countries should also adopt
similar initiatives.
The direct funding system, on the other hand, could be an expansion of the
already common U.S. practice of directing cy pres awards in class action lawsuits to
privacy NGOs.278 A problem with cy pres settlements in data protection suits is the
occasional distribution of awards to organizations that are not directly connected to
online privacy.279 To address this, the law could encourage awards to be funneled to
the public fund and distributed according to the aforementioned rules, potentially
ensuring that cy pres resources are not unduly targeted.
Both proposals have limitations. First, they focus on deterrence rather than
victim compensation—a choice which is justified at a time when enforcement levels
are low, but that could change in the future. Privacy class action settlements could
also continue to be unduly funneled to plaintiffs’ lawyers and organizations that do
not protect consumer privacy,280 or to a public grant system that can be diverted to
accomplish interests other than those that were initially envisioned. 281 To prevent
these limitations, it is important that judges closely monitor settlements and that laws
create a centralized, public database that lists all damages awards and public grants
to enable oversight. Laws may also ensure that the fund has an obligation to award
at least a percentage of its annual budget, impose strict conflict of interest rules, and
increase the number of independent civil society representatives that are part of the

274. Id.
275. See Seleções Anteriores, MINISTÉRIO DA JUSTIÇA E SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA, https://www.gov.br
/mj/pt-br/assuntos/seus-direitos/consumidor/direitos-difusos/selecoes-anteriores
[https://perma.cc/A3
WN-J95F] (last visited Dec. 23, 2021).
276. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.160(b)(2)(B) (effective Jan. 1, 2023). The distribution of the 9% would
be: (i) 3% to nonprofit organizations to promote and protect consumer privacy, (ii) 3% to nonprofit
organizations and public agencies to educate children in the area of online privacy, and (iii) 3% to state
and local law enforcement agencies to fund cooperative programs with international law enforcement
organizations. Id. § 1798.160(B)(i)-(iii).
277. Id. For instance, even if CCPA fines reach an unprecedented $100,000,000, this would lead to an
annual distribution of $3,000,000, which is arguably not enough to support many large-scale organizations
that employ lawyers, tech specialists, etc.
278. See STIGLER CTR., supra note 256, at 220.
279. Rotenberg & Jacobs, supra note 148, at 309, 321.
280. See id. at 309.
281. The Brazilian fund did not award grants for many years because the government earmarked the
funds to help diminish the public budget deficit. See Disputa envolvendo bilionário Fundo de Defesa dos
Direitos Difusos revela órgão aparelhado pelo MP, MIGALHAS (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.migalhas.
com.br/quentes/311274/disputa-envolvendo-bilionario-fundo-de-defesa-dos-direitos-difusos-revelaorgao-aparelhado-pelo-mp [https://perma.cc/N8L9-MFE9].
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management council. Finally, different jurisdictions should establish separate funds,
ensuring some form of competition over governance.
Still, a data protection regulatory regime that expands the funding of
independent and sophisticated data privacy intermediaries—allowing them to tap
into donations, grants, and awards from tort litigation—would be much more capable
of detecting wrongdoing than one that is overtly reliant on public regulators.
B. Bringing Data Protection Violations to Light
The information asymmetries between how companies collect and process
personal data and what society and regulators know about this collection, increase
the importance of mechanisms designed to bring violations to the attention of
overseers. A stronger, better-funded civil society will increase monitoring resources.
Antitrust, anti-corruption, and anti-corporate fraud regimes show that it is important
that regulatory systems also encourage insiders to report illegal behavior through the
establishment of a robust whistleblowing program.
Whistleblowers (in particular employees) are key to the discovery of corporate
fraud.282 Antitrust regulators have also long relied on leniency programs—through
which companies denounce cartels in exchange for a more lenient prosecution—as a
key mechanism to bring otherwise secret and illegal private deals to light.283 Indeed,
past studies have found that having access to privileged internal information greatly
increases the probability of successfully exposing hidden fraud.284 Offering financial
incentives to those who reveal fraud also significantly improves the probability that
employees will expose wrongdoing and diminishes mistaken denunciations. 285
Increasing compliance with online privacy laws will require redesigning
regulatory systems to bring otherwise obscure violations to light. These comparative
experiences showcase the importance of data protection authorities establishing

282. Dyck et al., supra note 265, at 2225-26 (surveying 216 high-profile corporate fraud cases in the
U.S. and finding that employees, non-financial market regulators, business analysts, and the media were
responsible for 54% of all corporate frauds exposed, with employees being the most important at 17% of
cases); Andrew C. Call et al., Whistleblowers and Outcomes of Financial Misrepresentation Enforcement
Actions, 56 J. ACCT. RSCH. 123, 126, 128 (2018) (reviewing 658 SEC enforcement actions for fraud and
finding that “employee whistleblowers play an integral role in monitoring firm behavior”); ORG. FOR
ECON. COOP. & DEV., THE DETECTION OF FOREIGN BRIBERY: THE ROLE OF WHISTLEBLOWERS AND
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION 3, 11 (2017) (stressing the key role whistleblowers play in revealing
foreign bribery).
283. See generally RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 246, at 6; REVIEW OF THE
RECOMMENDATION, supra note 246.
284. See Dyck et al., supra note 265, at 2215, 2231 (finding that a potential detector’s access to internal
company data increased that actor’s probability of detecting fraud by 15%); Call et al., supra note 265, at
126 (finding that whistleblower involvement in the enforcement process is associated with greater
monetary penalties for targeted firms and longer prison sentences for targeted employees).
285. Dyck et al., supra note 265, at 2246 (finding that whistleblower employees in the healthcare
industry, where there are financial incentives to report cases, were responsible for 41% of frauds exposed
in the industry, versus 14% in other industries without financial incentives). The rate of frivolous
corporate fraud lawsuits is lower in healthcare than in other industries. Id. In fact, among the fraud
committing firms studied, those in the health care industry had a 27% higher probability of having an
employee as the whistleblower. Id.
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robust whistleblowing programs specifically aimed at encouraging the reporting of
data protection violations.286 In particular, it is key that this program:
i.

Defines a “whistleblower” broadly to include not only formal
employees but also contractors, consultants, former employees,
temporary employees, etc.287 The program should also protect
public employees who may report potential capture of regulatory
authorities.

ii.

Raises awareness of the protections afforded by the program to
potential reporting persons by hosting workshops, requiring
corporate training, and publicizing the program broadly in
specialized channels and in the media.288

iii. Allows for potential whistleblowers to obtain confidential advice
from the public authority before filing a report.289 This has been
done, for example, both in the Netherlands and in the U.S. In the
U.S., the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) created a
specialized whistleblower hotline to provide guidance to potential
corporate-fraud whistleblowers.290 As an alternative, the data
protection fund discussed above could provide resources to
independent, private third-parties like NGOs dedicated to
protecting and guiding potential whistleblowers or even
representing them before authorities.291

286. Both California and the EU have general whistleblower protections. In California, whistleblower
laws that provide general protections against retaliation for revealing wrongdoing include the California
Whistleblower Protection Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8547.8 (West 2021), the False Claims Actions Act,
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12651 (West 2021), and California Labor Code, CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West
2021). In the EU, Directive 2019/1937 (October 2019) establishes minimum levels of whistleblowing
protection around the EU and also requires member states to ensure that their whistleblower protection
program encompass violations of data protection laws. See Directive 2019/1937, of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the Protection of Persons Who Report Breaches of
Union Law, art. 1, 2019 O.J. (L 305). Yet, the translation of these commands to a dedicated data
protection program is lagging. California, along with important EU jurisdictions such as Ireland and
Luxembourg, do not yet have a dedicated data protection whistleblowing program. In general, these
whistleblowing protection statutes fall short of the many recommendations for a robust protection program
that are made herein. For example, the EU Directive does not encourage financial rewards that are key
for an effective program. See, e.g., Dimitrios Kafteranis, Rethinking Financial Rewards for WhistleBlowers Under the Proposal for a Directive on the Protection of Whistle-Blowers Reporting Breaches of
EU Law, 2 NORDIC J. EUR. L. 38 (2019).
287. REVIEW OF THE RECOMMENDATION, supra note 246, at 15.
288. Id. at 4.
289. Id. at 7-8.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 9.
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iv. Protects the anonymity of whistleblowers.292 For example, in
Austria, authorities have created a portal through which corporatefraud whistleblowers may report wrongdoings using a secure
mailbox that encrypts the information, protects their anonymity,
and enables authorities to provide feedback and updates about the
status of the claim.293
v.

Provides financial rewards for successful reports. Financial
rewards are key to encouraging whistleblowing294 because
employees who report wrongdoing risk ending their careers.
These rewards should be large enough to encourage
whistleblowing and include minimum thresholds to help prevent
frivolous claims. For example, whistleblowers who provide the
U.S. SEC with information that leads to over one million U.S.
dollars in sanctions are rewarded with ten to thirty percent of the
money collected.295

vi. Protects good-faith whistleblowers from retaliation—a common
occurrence in tech markets—through tactics such as broad civil
remedies or punitive damages.296 Most whistleblowers prefer to
first report company wrongdoing internally and alert regulators
only when the company then refuses to take action.297 The law
should make clear that these employees are protected, and require
that companies have an obligation to forward any serious
whistleblower complaints to regulators within a given period. The
law should also shield good-faith whistleblowers when they report
wrongdoing to journalists and other private intermediaries that can
call attention to potential problems.
vii. Finally, these programs should protect whistleblowers from civil
and criminal charges—such as slander, violation of trade secrets,
corporate espionage, and defamation—that well-resourced
organizations may use to silence reporting parties.298

292. Dyck et al., supra note 265, at 2240, 2245 (finding that in 37% of cases employee whistleblowers
do not identify themselves, and that in 82% of cases where employees were named, the individuals were
fired, quit under distress, or had significantly altered responsibilities as a result of revealing the
wrongdoing).
293. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 282, at 10.
294. Dyck et al., supra note 265, at 2251 (“A natural implication of our findings is that the role of
monetary incentives should be expanded.”).
295. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 282, at 11.
296. Id. at 19-20.
297. Id. at 14. See generally Issie Lapowsky, For Big Tech Whistleblowers, There’s No Such Thing
as ‘Moving On’, PROTOCOL (Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.protocol.com/big-tech-whistleblowers [https://
perma.cc/ZMQ2-96PP].
298. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 282, at 11.
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These principles would certainly have to be adapted to jurisdictional laws, but a
dedicated data protection whistleblower program that incorporates even most of
these principles would diminish information asymmetries and increase the
enforcement of online privacy.
C. Increasing Governmental Accountability
Finally, while some characteristics of data protection weaken exit and voice and
reinforce the importance of a solid public enforcement system, heightened risk of
capture by private or public interests in data policy also emphasizes the need for
institutional safeguards to protect the public interest. Many important data protection
regulators are unjustifiably opaque, such as those of Ireland, Luxembourg, and even
the U.S. By requiring authorities to publicize a wide range of information about their
enforcement actions, online data privacy regimes can diminish the costs of private
oversight and help expose eventual problems. After all, sunshine is the best of
disinfectants when fighting entrenched private interests.
Again, a comparison with antitrust law can help showcase how to improve the
design of data protection laws. Extensive public disclosure rules have been
instrumental in understanding how corporate donations influence advice in
competition policy.299 Multiple reports have suggested enhancing the transparency
obligations of U.S. antitrust,300 which would increase public confidence in regulators
and hinder attempts of regulatory capture. Extensive discovery rights have also
helped expose many cases of corporate malpractice.301
Some antitrust systems have been expressly designed to maximize transparency
to help fight regulatory capture without undermining enforcement capacity. The
Brazilian experience is noteworthy. Brazil’s competition law establishes that
antitrust proceedings should be public by default, but that the private parties may
request, or the regulator may determine, that certain types of information be kept
confidential.302 To comply with this legal requirement, the Conselho Administrativo
de Defesa Econômica (CADE) (the Brazilian antitrust authority) created a system
where private parties are required to prepare both a public and a confidential version
of any document they file before CADE. CADE’s systems also host public and
confidential versions of all of CADE’s opinions—including statements of objections
or opinions to approve a merger or dismiss an investigation. All the public versions
of both private and public documents are freely available on CADE’s website, while
299. See generally Wakabayashi, supra note 268.
300. See generally WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, THE FED. TRADE COMM’N AT 100: INTO OUR 2ND
CENTURY, THE CONTINUING PURSUIT OF BETTER PRACTICES 119-20 (2009) (discussing the importance
of closing statements and transparency of FTC actions); AM. ANTITRUST INST., THE NEXT ANTITRUST
AGENDA: THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE’S TRANSITION REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY TO
THE 44TH PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. 187 (2008) (stressing the need for increased transparency of FTC and
DOJ enforcement actions); ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS 6467 (2007) (reiterating the importance of closing statements and increased transparency in all enforcement
actions).
301. Cf. Roy Shapira & Luigi Zingales, Is Pollution Value-maximizing? The DuPont Case, 2, 6-7
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23866, 2017) (showcasing how internal DuPont
documents exposed at trial were key to uncovering illegal practices by the company).
302. Article 49 of Brazilian Antitrust Law (Law N.° 12,529/11).
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the private versions are protected by secrecy laws. Some investigations require
absolute secrecy (e.g., cartel investigations before dawn raids). For those, CADE
maintains a smaller public and a more extensive private record, but both are
confidential until the authority rules that publicity will not harm the investigation,
nor the parties involved. However, ultimately the public record is made available to
civil society.
Requiring private parties to disclose in advance what specific pieces of
information they understand as confidential is important because it: (i) expedites
disclosure; (ii) allows CADE to focus potential disputes on key pieces of data over
which there is disagreement; and (iii) allows interested private parties to better
understand and challenge abusive confidentiality requests. While this system
increases administrative costs, the structure, which requires private parties to
cooperate in implementing regulatory transparency, helps minimize negative
impacts on enforcement actions. Indeed, CADE hosts one of the most active anticartel programs in the world and—despite Brazil’s history of corruption—CADE’s
work is well-recognized by Brazilians and international organizations alike. 303
Data protection laws should impose similar obligations on regulators. In
particular, it would be important that regulators: (i) maintain a webpage that lists
ongoing investigations, describing the scope of the investigation and the interested
parties; (ii) upload public versions of new case developments such as statements of
scope and indictments to this webpage (e.g., Statements of Objection) as well as the
company’s responses; and (iii) upload public versions of opinions and settlements to
this webpage, as well as at least a short but precise justification on the reasons why
authorities decided to close investigations, settle cases, or impose fines.
CONCLUSION
The GDPR, CCPA, CPRA, and their dozens of international counterparts have,
and will continue to, bring about profound changes. Data markets, usually left
almost to their own devices, now face a new environment where the state mediates
at least part of the interactions between companies and consumers. Yet, data
protection laws have been failing to fully deliver on their promises. This Article
suggests that this has been in part because legislators have not anticipated how the
particularly pervasive information asymmetries and market power found in many
data markets undermine the role of markets, torts, and regulatory enforcement as
mechanisms to ensure legal compliance.
Democratic governments around the world have decided that these data
protection regulatory regimes are here to stay. Societies must now ensure that these
laws lead to meaningful improvements on the ground. This Article suggests that

303. The OECD affirmed that CADE is “well regarded domestically and internationally within the
practitioner community, with peer agencies and within the Brazilian administration” and praised CADE’s
work in prosecuting cartels. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., PEER REVIEWS OF COMPETITION LAW AND
POLICY: BRAZIL 9-11 (2019). In addition, the prestigious British magazine Global Competition Review
considered CADE the best antitrust agency in the Americas in three of the past five years. Cade is
Awarded the Agency of the Year in the Americas, CADE (Nov. 4, 2018),
http://antigo.cade.gov.br/cade_english/cade-is-awarded-the-agency-of-the-year-in-the-americas [https://
perma.cc/6DEQ-P7JV].
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narrowing data protection’s enforcement gap is not impossible, but it will require
better institutional design. Multiplying monitoring and enforcement resources,
encouraging insiders to bring violations to light, and promoting regulatory
accountability are important but are only initial solutions to help tackle a multifaceted and complex problem. This is a field that will welcome contributions from
lawyers, data and political scientists, economists, psychologists, and many other
scholars for years to come.
APPENDIX
Impacts on the Ground: A Survey of the Empirical Evidence on How the GDPR
and CCPA Impacted Data Protection
A survey of empirical studies assessing the impacts of the GDPR and the CCPA
on actual data collection and processing points to underwhelming results so far.
None of the twenty-six independent studies surveyed found meaningful compliance
on the ground. In particular, twenty studies, summarized below, found widespread
violations.304
i.

A review of 2,000 high profile websites found that while the
GDPR did give users more privacy controls, “tracking is
prevalent, happens mostly without user’s consent, and opt-out is
difficult.” Ninety-two percent of websites start tracking users
before providing them with any notice and 85% continue tracking
them or add even more cookies after the users opt-out.305

ii.

A review of the privacy policies of 194 firms before and after the
passage of the GDPR found that while the vast majority amended
their policies to become more information protective, “the overall
level of compliance [with GDPR provisions] is not high in
absolute terms.”306

iii.

A study tracking 1,250 top-visited European and U.S. websites
before and after the GDPR (February 2018 to September 2018)

304. It is worth noting that many European studies focus on the collection and processing of data
through cookies, which have limitations. Cookies are mostly regulated by the ePrivacy directive.
However, Article 7 of the GDPR has reframed what constitutes effective consent for the collection of
personal data, including through cookies. Therefore, these studies found violations of both the ePrivacy
directive and the GDPR. These findings are backed by European case law. See, e.g., C-673/17,
Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbānde – Verbraucherzentrale
Bundesverband eV v. Planet49 GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2019:801 (Oct. 1, 2019); see also Cristiana Santos et
al., Are Cookie Banners Indeed Compliant with the Law? Deciphering EU Legal Requirements on
Consent and Technical Means to Verify Compliance of Cookie Banners, 2020 TECH. & REGUL. 91, 91-92
(2020).
305. Sanchez-Rola et al., supra note 8, at 5, 9-10 (including both first-party and third-party tracking).
306. Davis & Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 63, at 667, 699.
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found only a small decrease in advertising third-party requests,
which the authors could not directly link to the GDPR. 307
iv.

A survey of the five most popular Consent Management
Platforms (CMPs) used by the UK’s ten thousand most accessed
websites found that by September 2019 only 11.8% of the UK
websites met minimum notice and consent requirements.308

v.

A study of one thousand randomly selected EU consent notices
collected through October 2018 found that 57% of these notices
nudge users towards privacy-unfriendly options and 96% of them
provide either no consent choice or confirmation only, violating
the GDPR.309

vi.

Another study of 1,426 consent banners used by the 22,949 most
accessed websites in Europe found that, by September 2019, 10%
of websites placed cookies before giving the user any choice and
5% still placed the cookies after the user refused to give consent.
Overall, the study found that 54% of websites surveyed violated
legal requirements.310

vii. A study of cookie placements in 35,000 popular EU websites
after four years of coming into compliance with the European eprivacy directive found that between 49% and 74% placed
tracking cookies before receiving consent (depending on the
definition of tracking), a percentage that stayed constant after the
GDPR came into effect. This indicates that both policies were
ineffective,311 and points to a lack of auditing by regulators.312
viii. A study analyzing the five hundred most visited websites for each
EU country found that, even after the GDPR, 15% of the websites
studied had no privacy policy, 37% did not comply with cookies
consent notices, and the amount of consumer tracking pre- and

307. Jannick Sørensen & Sokol Kosta, Before and After GDPR: The Changes in Third Party Presence
at Public and Private European Websites, THE WORLD WIDE WEB CONF. 1590, 1599 (2019).
308. Midas Nouwens et al., Dark Patterns After the GDPR: Scraping Consent Pop-ups and
Demonstrating their Influence 6 (Apr. 20, 2020) (on file with ACM.org).
309. Utz et al., supra note 103, at 976.
310. Célestin Matte et al., Do Cookie Banners Respect my Choice? Measuring Legal Compliance of
Banners from IAB Europe’s Transparency and Consent Framework 2 (Feb. 21, 2020) (on file with
arXiv.org).
311. Trevisan et al., supra note 57, at 127, 133, 140.
312. Id.
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post-GDPR mostly remained the same.313 The study warned
against a false sense of GDPR compliance.314
ix.

Another study of the 27,000 most accessed websites in the EU,
the U.S., and Canada found that the GDPR initially led to a 14.9%
drop in the use of third-party vendors, but that number rebounded
to pre-GDPR levels by the end of 2018, potentially because firms
became less afraid of enforcement actions.315

x.

A cookie sweep of thirty-eight large data processors by the Irish
Data Protection Commission found that more than eighteen
months after the GDPR had come into force, 92% did not comply
with the law.316

xi.

Another cookie sweep of 175 websites performed by the Dutch
data protection authority in December 2019 found that almost no
website was fully compliant with legal requirements.317

xii. An in-depth study covering data from January 1, 2018 to July 31,
2018 from one of the largest online travel agencies and travel
meta-search engines found that the GDPR resulted in a reduction
of 12.5% in total cookies (not total consumers because one
consumer can have many cookies), which is a proxy for decreased
online tracking.318 However, the remaining consumers are more
persistently trackable after the GDPR, so the overall level of
online tracking increased by 8%—something that should lead to
increased ability to predict consumer behavior.319
xiii. An interesting analysis of data interconnection agreements and
interconnection points to Internet Service Providers (a proxy for
data transfers) pre- and post- GDPR was conducted in 2020.
Contrary to expectations, the study found that the GDPR had a
statistically significant net zero effect, meaning that the GDPR

313. Degeling et al., supra note 65, at 7-8, 10, 14.
314. Id.
315. Johnson et al., supra note 201, at 14-15.
316. DATA PROT. COMM’N, supra note 9, at 6.
317. Nieuwsbericht, supra note 67.
318. Guy Aridor et al., The Effect of Privacy Regulation on the Data Industry: Empirical Evidence
from GDPR 3-4, 15-18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26900, 2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/1548288/privacycon-2020-guy_aridor.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6QA4-H56Q].
319. Id.
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has not led to decreases in data traffic that could potentially
impact investments in internet networks.320
xiv. A 2020 large-scale survey of 17,000 websites and more than
7,500 cookie banners in the UK and Greece (14,000 in the UK
and 3,000 in Greece) found that only 50% of websites display a
cookie notice, and that the majority of websites employed dark
patterns to nudge users towards acceptance. The study concluded
that a “substantial proportion of the websites do not comply with
the [GDPR] even at the very basic level.”321
xv.

A detailed survey of GDPR and ePrivacy Directive requirements
for consent involving the collection of information through
cookies concluded that fully automatic consent verification by
technical means is not compliant with both laws. Yet, this is the
widespread method of adoption in the EU.322

xvi. A study conducted in January 2020 analyzed the basis for the
collection and processing of personal data by more than six
hundred European advertisers. The findings “demonstrate[] the
persistence of the advertising industry in non-compliant (with
GDPR and ePrivacy Directive) methods for tracking and
profiling, bundled in often complex and vague presentation of
purposes.”323
xvii. An automated and manual visit of the top five hundred UK
websites before and after the GDPR, combined with 8,416
websites from the browsing of fifteen users in the UK and China,
found that websites that gave users more choice in terms of
cookie compliance stored more cookies after the enactment of the
GDPR. It also found that many websites appear to disregard user
choice, storing cookies despite denials in consent, and that the
number of tracking cookies remained stable before and after the
enactment of the GDPR.324

320. Ran Zhuo et al., The Impact of the General Data Protection Regulation on Internet
Interconnection 4, 38 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26481, 2020),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w26481/revisions/w26481.rev0.pdf [https://perma.cc
/3GRC-SZQ3].
321. Georgios Kampanos & Siamak F. Shahandashti, Accept All: The Landscape of Cookie Banners
in Greece and the UK 1, 14 (Apr. 12, 2021) (on file with arXiv.org).
322. Santos et al., supra note 304, at 92, 135.
323. Célestin Matte et al., Purposes in IAB Europe’s TCF: Which Legal Basis and How are They Used
by Advertisers? 2 (May 7, 2020) (on file with hal.inria.fr).
324. Xuehui Hu & Nishanth Sastry, Characterising Third Party Cookie Usage in the EU After GDPR
2 (May 3, 2019) (on file with arXiv.org).
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xviii. A fascinating survey of more than 900 news and media websites
in the U.S. and the EU between April 2018 and November 2019
found that while the introduction of the GDPR led to an initial
decrease in the number of third-party cookies and tracking
responses in EU websites, this number quickly rebounded to preGDPR levels.325 In addition, the study found that the GDPR had
a small but significant impact on the amount of page views, but
no significant impact on the quantity of content published or the
quality of content and social media engagement, even for
websites that relied heavily on advertisement.326 Given the study
set-up, this may be interpreted to mean that the GDPR did not
meaningfully impact the tracking capacity of these websites.
xix. A February 2020 PwC survey of the websites of the six hundred
largest companies in the U.S. found that a majority of these
websites did not offer portals for users to access their
information.327
xx.

A survey by DataGrail, a U.S. privacy management tool, found
that throughout 2020 business-to-consumer companies received,
on average, 137 data subject requests per million identities they
hold per year, with the average stabilizing at around eleven
requests per month.328 This means that only 0.001% of
consumers are exercising their rights despite the average cost of
almost $200,000 per request.329

xxi. While not specifically targeted at the CCPA or the GDPR, a
September 2020 scan of more than eighty thousand of the world’s
most popular websites found that tracking remains ubiquitous
around the world and in the U.S., even for highly sensitive
websites, such as those of abortion providers or for victims of
sexual violence.330 The general conclusion is that third-party
tracking is as pervasive now as it was ten years ago, but it has
only “become creepier and more difficult to stop.”331
Other studies present a more favorable picture of the on the ground impact of
the GDPR. Even those, however, also show only a limited impact and introduce
important caveats about the state of GDPR enforcement.

325. Vincent Lefrere et al., The Impact of the GDPR on Content Providers 6, 32-33 (Dec. 2021) (on
file with SSRN.com).
326. Id. at 47-48, 55.
327. PWC, supra note 2.
328. DATAGRAIL, supra note 13, at 4-6.
329. Id.
330. Sankin & Mattu, supra note 70.
331. Angwin, supra note 71.
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i.

One study analyzed web tracking by 5,100 of the most visited EU
websites between September 2017 and April 2019, and found that
the adoption of the GDPR was correlated with a 9% reduction of
third-party tracking cookies for the median website, and a 17%
reduction in third-party HTTP requests for the median website.332
However, it also found that the GDPR led to no change in
tracking by the most pervasive companies, such as Google,
Facebook, Amazon and others.333 These companies would have
expanded to more even websites.

ii.

One study of 110,000 websites between May 2017 and November
2018 estimated that the GDPR has led to a 10% decrease in thirdparty tracking cookies, a smaller increase in first-party cookies,
and a 6% decrease in requests to third-party websites that disclose
their collection of personal data. The authors of the study see this
as evidence that the GDPR achieved at least some data
minimization goals.334 However, they also found that third-party
requests in general, which can be seen as a proxy for tracking,
rebounded to pre-GDPR levels as companies learned how to
navigate compliance.335 In any event, the absolute impact levels
are low for such an all-encompassing regulation.

iii.

A rare study comparing permissions for data access in the fifty
most downloaded apps from Android’s Google Play store
between March 2017 and December 2018 found a general
decrease in the number of permission requests for apps—
particularly to access contacts, location, calendar, SMS, and
phone.336 It also found less use of these permissions in idle mode.
However, it noted that apps are more frequently using
permissions for camera, microphone, and body sensors.337 The
overall conclusion is that app privacy has only moderately
improved since the GDPR’s entry into force.338

iv.

An automated analysis of the privacy policies of 695 websites
(that appear in the Top 500 ranking in Alexa’s Top Sites service)
between November 2017 and October 2019 found that enacting
the GDPR led to changes in privacy policies in the U.S. and EU.

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
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Further, a manual coding of 246 policies found that EU-based
websites became much more compliant with GDPR
requirements.339 Still, the average formal compliance with
GDPR requirements was only 68%.340
v.

Finally, one study using Adobe Analytics data for 1,084
dashboards found that the GDPR led to a 11.7% decrease in page
views for European websites and a 13.3% revenue fall for ecommerce websites. This was partially motivated (6.9-29%) by
users not providing consent to data collection and by decreases in
paid marketing channels as drivers of traffic. While the study
does not assess data collection or its impacts on web-tracking, it
states that the vast majority of websites in their sample adopts an
opt-out approach for consent, which is in violation of data
protection laws and that changes in marketing budgets are
consistent with some websites moving ads from channels that
rely on personal data to others that do not. Overall, the study
found “modest progress” towards GDPR compliance.341

Importantly, although they are very valuable, these studies have a selection bias
in reporting what they can count readily. They usually use third-party cookies as
proxies for tracking because this is what can be measured by external sweeps.
However, this methodology has important limitations.
First, these sweeps cannot measure how much data is actually collected through
each cookie, so they are an imperfect proxy at best. Second, many companies (such
as Google and Facebook) responded to data protection laws not by diminishing data
collection, but by embedding their third-party code in first-party applications.342
There are even fewer studies addressing legal compliance with regard to equally
intrusive but less “transparent” tracking mechanisms such as pixels, tags,
fingerprinting, local storage, browser extensions, single sign-on, or even direct
matching and sharing of personal data. A large survey on browser fingerprinting,
for example, argued that their increasing prevalence and stealth nature made it
“particularly dangerous” to the privacy of users.343 Third, many cookie sweeps also
restrict their analysis to homepages, but studies found more pervasive online tracking

339. Jens Frankenreiter, The Missing “California Effect” in Data Privacy Law, 39 YALE J. REG.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 48-49) (on file with author).
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342. COMPETITION & MKTS. AUTH., supra note 90, at G8, G25-26 (explaining the shift and how it
enables continued tracking despite decreases in third-party cookies).
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beyond the homepage.344 Fourth, there are few studies looking on how these laws
have impacted tracking outside of the browser world, in particular for mobile apps
and smart devices. This limitation exists even though mobile apps have been found
to be more invasive than browsers and other evidence points to widespread collection
of personal data by mobile apps and devices.345 When these limitations are
accounted for, it is likely that online privacy violations are much more widespread
than what has been diagnosed.

344. See generally Englehardt & Narayanan, supra note 95, at 1394 (reporting an average of eighteen
trackers per website homepage that increased to thirty-four per page when four pages were visited within
the website).
345. See Papadopoulos et al., supra note 96, at 154, 158; COMPETITION & MKTS. AUTH., supra note
90, at G27.

